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ABSTRACT 
The Civil War is one o f  the most significant events 
in American history . President Abraham Linco l n ' s  term in 
office was dominated by the war , therefore the study o f  
Lincoln has likewise been dominated b y  War developments. 
The war ' s  battles were overwhe lmingly concentrated in the 
eastern United States, and hence the American west has 
largely been ignored by Lincol n  scholars . This study 
attempts to uncover Lincoln ' s  policy toward Oregon, 
including War developments and his domestic po licy , to 
part i a l ly fill  the "western gap" in Lincoln scholarship . 
Oregon was admitted to the federal Union in 1 8 5 9 ,  
and by Lincoln ' s  election in 1 8 6 0  that state ' s  population 
remained Lelatively smal l .  Shortly after Linco ln ' s  e lection 
the Civ i l  war broke out, and Oregon ' s  remoteness from 
Washington , D.C. made its situation d i f ficult for Lincoln 
because communication was slow without a te legraph and 
transportation was laggard without the transcontinenta l 
railroad . A majority o f  Oregonians remained loyal to the 
Union , however a vocal minority formed a chapter of the 
Knights of the Golden Circle in Oregon to hinder the War ' s  
success. The Knights even all ied with other individuals in 
an e ffort to separate Oregon and Ca l i fornia tram the Union 
and form an independent Pacific Coast Republic . Oregon 
cons i s ted mainly of Democratic voters, and a fter the War 
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began Oregon ' s  Democratic Governor John Whiteaker was 
hos t i le toward Lincoln ' s  vigorous prosecution of the war . 
The attack on Fort Sumter by the Confederates had a 
great impact upon the Oregonians. Most Oregonians viewed 
the Confederate attack as the act that initiated the Wa r ,  
and as a result Union sentiment in Oregon was strengthened. 
Lincoln acted quickly to secure Oregon for the Union by 
forming a regiment of cavalry to remain in Oregon to guard 
its frontier during the Wa r .  The cavalry per formed its 
duties we l l  until their term of enlistment expired a�d 
Lincoln authorized a regiment o f  cavalry to take i t s  place . 
Although the majority o f  Oregonians supported Lincoln and 
the War , the troops were needed to suppres s  threatened 
uprisings by the Knights and Indians l iving in Oregon . 
Lincoln ' s  war policy toward Oregon was j ust one part 
of his overall policy . Along with forming troop regiment s , 
initiating the construction o f  forts , and supplying Oregon 
with an iron-clad , Lincoln also had a domestic policy toward 
Oregon . Lincoln re formed the federal circuit court system 
in order to include Oregon and other states into the system . 
Lincoln also signed the Homestead Act ,  the Pacific Ra ilroad 
Act ,  and an act to provide economic assistance for a Paci f i c  
telegraph , a l l  o f  which were pieces o f  legislation that 
Oregonians had long coveted . In return Oregon shipped large 
quantities of its gold eastward to help finance the war 
e f for t .  
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Lincoln ' s  policy toward Oregon was one o f  patience and 
prudenc e .  Lincoln insured Oregonian support for the Union 
by supporting legislation that they had perennially demanded 
without antagonizing the Knight s .  He a lso acted decisively 
in his war policy toward Oregon that enabled that state to 
mob i l i ze against both internal and external foe s .  
iii 
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I .  INTRODUCTION 
President Abraham Lincol n ' s  term in o ffice i s  the 
subject of varied interpretation s .  The interpretations 
range from Lincol n ' s  glori fication as a martyr and sain t ,  
to some revisioni sts ' descriptions o f  him a s  a conniving , 
racist tyran t .  These profoundly divergent interpretations 
exist partia l ly because Lincoln ' s  administration experienced 
American history ' s  most tumultuous period , and that period ' s  
bitter sectional feelings l i nger somewhat to the present . 
The sheer number of people interested i n  the American Civil 
War , coupled with the intense,  conflicting attitudes that 
Americans have concerning the War have made Lincol n ' s  
presidency the most written about admin i stration in American 
history . Voluminous accoun t s ,  revi sions , analyses , and 
interpretations have been written concerning Abraham 
Lincoln,  and one might assume that every aspect o f  h i s  
presidency has been covered. However ,  that i s  not the case . 
The American Wes t  i s  rarely mentioned in volumes 
concerning Abraham Lincoln . Many " de finitive" sources 
hardly mention Lincol n ' s  policy toward the area wes t of the 
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Mississippi River , let alone the Pacific Coa s t .  This i s  
because historians tend to concentrate solely on Civil War 
development s .  The purpose of this study is to partially 
fill this void in the historiography of Lincoln scho larship . 
This study wil l  explore Lincoln ' s  policy toward Oregon 
during his presidential tenure . It wi l l  includ e :  a brief 
description o f  Oregon ' s  history from its exploration through 
the election of 1860 in order to gain a perspective on 
Oregon ' s  population a nd political environment,  Linco ln ' s  
military and internal policy toward Oregon, and public 
reaction to Lincoln ' s  presidency wil l  complete the study . 
This study is intended to look at Oregon ' s  relationship t o  
the federal government and the Lincoln administration , and 
it is not a detailed s tudy of Oregon during the Civil War . 
Surprisingly , the histories o f  Oregon and Lincoln 
shared more than is superficially apparent . Many migrants 
to Oregon were Lincoln ' s  c lose personal friends ,  with whom 
he kept in contact during his presidenc y ,  and some received 
federal appointment s .  Also , Oregon ' s  internal political 
situation during the War was such that it demanded Lincol n ' s  
attention and action a lthough the state was far removed from 
the major military battles and political controversie s .  
Long before Lincoln ' s  administration , however , Oregon was 
a remote ,  western frontier that attracted intense inter­
national competition for settlement . 
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The famed "Northwest Passage" lured explorers into 
Oregon . The British , under Captain James Cook , were the 
f i r s t  to " discover" Oregon in 1778. Although the British 
did not find the potentially lucrative "Northwest Passage , "  
they d i d  find wealth by cheaply obtaining sea otter pe l t s  
from t h e  Indians and s e l ling them for extremely high returns 
in China . By 1785 many British private trading companies , 
along with King George ' s  royal company , were reaping 
Oregon ' s  wealth. Subsequent English explorers ,  such as 
George Vancouver and Alexander Mackenzie ' 'firmly e s tablished 
England ' s  title to the Northwest , "  yet the Americans were 
far from being out of the picture . l 
In 1787 Robert Gray and Benjamin Kindrick , lured by 
Cook ' s  published journa l ,  eagerly sai led for Oregon to enter 
the prosperous Oriental trad e .  Their voyage ' s  succes sful 
completion hastened Gray ' s  second expedition , in which he 
discovered the Columbia Rive r .  The United States and Great 
Britain avoided war in 1818 by agreeing to j ointly occupy 
the Oregon Country . The emigrant exodus from the eastern 
United States into Oregon was s lowly initiated . John Jacob 
Astor ' s  Pacific Fur Company in Astoria was viewed a s  a 
profitab l e ,  permanent American settlement in Oregon . The 
expectations for Astor ' s  permanent settlement were never 
rea lized , because he was forced to s e l l  h i s  company to the 
British North West Company in 1825. The British Hudson ' s  
Bay Company then establi shed Fort Vancouver on the Columbia 
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River where its financial and agricultural endeavors 
prospered , while American interest and prospects in Oregon 
dwind led . American interest in Oregon was later rekindled 
by a few v i sionary Congressmen. 2 
D r .  John Floyd introduced a b i l l  in Congress i n  1 8 2 0  
urging Oregon ' s  annexation , but i t  was voted down three 
years later . Hall Jackson Ke lly resumed the fight for 
Oregon by circulating pamphlets and letters around New 
England to heighten public enthusiasm, and by 1 8 3 1  he formed 
the ''American Society for Encouraging the Settlement o f  the 
Oregon 'l'erritory . "  Nathaniel J. Wyeth's pub l i shed journal 
of h i s  overland expedition to Oregon was a l so intended to 
induce migrants . Throughout the 1 8 3 0's , however , the 
maj ority of Oregon ' s  migrants were mis sionarie s .  These 
miss ionaries did not succeed in their goal of Christianiz ing 
the Indians , but they did succeed in keeping Oregon al ive 
in the minds of eastern American s .  During the 1 8 4 0 ' s ,  a 
dec i sive chain of events and c ircumstances a l lowed the 
United States to reclaim Oregon from the British . 
The proximity o f  a large number of potential American 
settlers was an advantageous factor for the United States , 
even though the British had s trong claims to the territory . 
An adequate inducement to settle Oregon was a l l  that 
Americans needed . This inducement was provided by many 
Oregon immigrant societies resulting in the " Great 
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Migration" of 1 8 4 3 . British interest in Oregon , on the 
other hand , diminished with the decline in the fur trade 
as beaver hats fe l l  out of style in Europe , and by 1 8 4 6 ,  
Amer icans were granted exclusive rights to settle i n  the 
Oregon country . The American government responded to the 
emigrant s '  demands for protection against I ndians , and the 
government ' s  Manifest Destiny desire to expand the United 
State s '  territory , and passed the b i l l  creating the Oregon 
Territory on August 1 4 ,  1 8 4 8 .  The Act was signed by 
Democratic President James K .  Polk. 3 Oregon Territory 
already possessed many distinctive characteristics by the 
time it was create d .  
Fol lowing the d i scovery o f  gold i n  1 8 4 9 ,  settlers 
poured into the Territory mostly from the Midwest . I n  
addition to the Midwesterners , about 2 1  p e r  cent of the 
Territory ' s  population emigrated from Southern s lave states , 
another 2 1  per cent emigrated from the Old Northwest , 8 per 
cent from the Mid-Atlantic state s ,  and j u s t  over 4 per cent 
from New England . The combination o f  an overwhelmingly 
rural population that was Democratic in i t s  po litical out­
look and the patronage of a national Democratic admini stra­
tion insured the entrenchment of a strong Democratic machine 
in the new territory . 4 In fac t ,  a Cali fornia newspaper 
correspondent to the Oregon Country was so impressed with 
that area ' s  preoccupation with power politics in 1357 that 
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he remarke d ,  "The Oregonians have two occupations , 
agriculture and politic s . " 5 
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II.  OREGON FROM TERRITORIAL STATUS THROUGH THE SECESSION 
CRISIS 
The Democratic machine in Oregon was ruled by the 
"Salem C l ique , "  which ran virtually every aspect of state 
politics.  This " Clique " was led by the new Territory ' s  most 
influential men :  General Joseph Lane , and Asahel Bush . 
Lane, a Brigadier General in the Mexican war, accepted his 
appointment as the first territorial governor of Oregon in 
1 8 4 8  and his popularity grew . He eventually became Oregon ' s  
first territorial delegate to Congress and one of  Oregon ' s  
first senators. Asahel Bush, known as "Ass o f  He l l "  Bush 
to his enemies, was the editor of the newspaper with the 
largest c irculation in Oregon , the Salem Oregon Statesman . 
Bush promoted Democratic positions on issues to a receptive 
audience through the outspoken columns of the State sman . 
The " C l ique " reflected a conservative political 
attitude due to the sectionally heterogenous population 
that migrated to Oregon . This diverse population placed 
an emphasis on the middle of the political spectrum rather 
than the extremes . 6 Oregon was forced to confront the issue 
of slavery before it was admitted to territorial status, and 
i t  applied this conservative approach to the issue . The 
question of Oregon Territory ' s  admission to the Union was 
raised j ust as the slavery i s sue began to heat up national-
ly . As a result , slavery was an abstract issue in Oregon , 
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although realistically s l avery was not an i s sue with the 
Oregonians . 
Oregon ' s  economy and geographic location made slavery 
economically infeasible and Oregonians made it clear that 
they did not want the peculiar institution within their 
borders .  The provisional legis lature sent a clear message 
concerning this i s sue in 18 4 4  when it passed an act that 
provided :  
That i f  any such free Negro or Mulatto shall fail  to 
quit the country as required by this act ,  he or she 
may be arrested upon a warrant i s sued by some j u s tice 
of the peace, and if gui lty upon trial before such 
justice , shall receive upon h i s  or her bare back not 
less than twenty nor more than t h irty-nine stripes , to 
be infl icted by the constable of the proper country . 
[And) that i f  any free Negro or Mulatto shall fail  
to quit the country within the term of s ix months a f ter 
receiving such s tr ipe s ,  he or she shall again receive 
the same punishment once in every s ix months until h e  
o r  she shall quit t h e  country . 7 
I t  was obvious that a lthough Oregonians did not want 
slavery , it was not due to a fundamental d i sagreement with 
the institution. In fac t ,  most Oregonians endorsed slavery 
but ,  they did not want blacks within their mids t .  Succinct-
ly stated , Oregonians were considerably more anti-black than 
anti-s lavery . Oregon ' s  shortsighted solut ion for i t s  loca l  
posi tion concerning slavery was typical of the independent 
attitude on the western frontier . Oregon ' s  independent air 
guided i t s  political dec i s ions unt i l  the eve of the Civil 
War .  
Polk remained president only a short time after the 
Oregon Terri tory was created . In the election of 18 4 8 , 
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the Whig Zachary Taylor was elected president and given 
control of federal patronage in the territories. The o f f  ice 
o f  territorial governor was directly appointed by the presi­
dent which usual ly meant i f  the party in power changed 
hands, partisan appointees would soon fol low sui t .  Oregon , 
a Democratic stronghold, was a logical place for Taylor 
to exercise his patronage powers and repay some campaign 
favors. I t  is interesting to note that Abraham Lincoln, 
a young Whig upstart , was nominated for secretary o f  the 
Oregon Territory and he was subsequently nominated 
territorial governor . Lincoln seriously considered the 
position, but Mary Todd Lincoln would not tolerate such an 
isolated , crude home and persuaded her husband to decline 
the appointment. In a letter dated September 2 7 ,  1 8 4 9 ,  
Lincoln expressed his gratitude for being o f fered the 
appointment , but politely declined . a Fortunately, we are 
only left to speculate what would have become of Abraham 
Lincoln had he accepted the appointment . John Pol lard 
Gaines fina l ly accepted the Oregon territorial governorship 
in August, 1850 and he encountered a l l  the problems that a 
Whig Governor in a Democratic territory should have 
expec ted . 
Soon after Oregon received territorial status, the 
residents complained that its independence was usurpe d .  
This attitude was typical o f  a frontier that was use 
to home rul e .  In many cases , as soon as the national 
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government exercised i t s  power over a newly created 
territory this was viewed by the frontiersmen as an 
encroachment upon their independenc e .  Oregon ' s  demands 
during its territorial status in the 1 8 5 0s were frequently 
confusing and often contradictory . Oregonians protested 
their loss of independence wh ile at the same time demanding 
land , money , and protection from the federal government . 
They a l so complained o f  both being d i c tated to and neglected 
by the federal government . 9 overa l l ,  Oregonians found their 
territorial status unacceptable . There fore , a revolt 
against territorial government began in 1 8 5 0 ,  almo s t  
irrunediately a fter the recognition o f  Oregon a s  a Territory . 
This movement was fueled when the Whig Governor Gaines was 
forced upon them. If Gaine s '  tenure was viewed as creating 
a flame from a spark , further events caused a full- fledged 
explosion in Oregon ' s  s tatehood movement . 
The introduction o f  the in famous Kansas-Nebraska Act in 
Congress by Stephen A .  Douglas in 1 8 5 4  profoundly e f fected 
Oregon politics for over a decade . Oregonians interpreted 
the Act as Congressional acquiescence in al lowing states 
greater independence.  Oregonians , who began their statehood 
movement in 185 1 for precisely that reason , complained that 
territorial status was tantamount to vassalage, and a fter 
the Kansas -Nebraska Act they equated statehood with 
independence . 1 0  By 1854 s lavery was the hottest i ssue in 
national politic s ,  there for e ,  Oregonians had to addrGss 
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the i s sue i n  their statehood movement. The Kansas-Nebraska 
Act provided not only the impetus Oregon ' s  statehood 
movement needed , but it also provided the parameters in 
which the s lavery i s sue would be d i sc u s sed . Due to the 
timing of the b i l l ' s  introduction and the framework it 
contained, the Kansas-Nebraska Act had a great impact upon 
Oregon . It would be impossible to discuss Abraham Lincoln ' s  
policy toward Oregon without understanding the Territory ' s  
position concerning s lavery . And , s i nce the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act prec ipitated an extensive debate over slavery in the 
Oregon Territory , it is necessary to briefly discuss the 
major viewpoints represented in that debate . 
The Oregon Territorial Legis lature quickly addressed 
the slavery i s sue . Oregonians interpreted the Kansas-
Nebraska Act only as it applied to thei r  s ituation . By the 
1 8 5 0 s ,  as mentioned ear l i e r ,  the Oregon Territory was 
inhabited by many pro- s lavery Democrat s .  The Territory 
outlawed s lavery not because its citiz ens d i s l iked the 
institution , but because they intensely hated b l acks . 
Therefor e ,  Oregonians hai led Douglas ' popular sovereignty 
principle as a way to exclude s lavery from their borders; 
but, they cared little i f  the institution spread to 
neighboring territor i e s . 1 1  Representing this v iewpoint 
in the Oregon Territor ial Legislature was Democrat Delazon 
Smith , known as "Delus ion"  Smith in rival newspapers . In 
December 1854 , Smith introduced a series of resolutions that 
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were adopted by the Territorial Legis lature endorsing 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act ,  however ,  this consensus met 
some oppos ition . 
Or . Anson G .  Henry , a Whi g ,  countered Smith ' s  resolu­
tions with a set o f  his own that presented an opposing 
viewpoin t .  Henry , a former Spring field , Il linois residen t ,  
personal physician and close friend o f  Abraham Lincoln , 
argued that the repeal o f  the Missouri Compromise would 
invite the spread of s lavery into every territory . He 
countered Smith by reasoning that s lavery would be al lowed 
to spread everywhere,  even into Oregon , " i f  there were no 
laws to prevent i t . 11 1 2  Surpr i singly , Henry ' s  conservative 
viewpojnt was not shared by many of his partisan colleagues 
in the legislature . Oregon ' s  Whig s '  independence r e f l ected 
the national party ' s  split . In fact , some o f  the mos t  
vociferous enemies t o  Henry ' s  resolutions were Whigs . 
David Logan, son o f  Lincoln ' s  former Springfield law partner 
Stephen T .  Logan , and an in fluential Whig member of the 
Oregon legi s l ature , denounced Henry ' s  proposals as " too 
ultra , and tinctured with abol itionism , to pledge the Whig 
party of Oregon to . ••1 3  Such was the nature of Oregon 
polit i c s .  The battle over slavery i n  Oregon was just one 
front in the two-pronged o f fensive it launched in order 
to obtain statehood . 
Washington , D . C .  
The other battle was fought in 
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The Washington f ight for Oregon's statehood, i n i tiated 
in 1 8 5 4  by Stephen A .  Douglas , was s l o w ,  c o n f u s i n g ,  and 
hypoc r i ti c a l . The Washington debate over Oregon ' s  admission 
is a l s o  r e l evant to this study due to its inherent entangle­
ment in the s lavery i s s u e , and the antagonism i t  caused 
among the d i f ferent s e c tions of the country which resulted 
in a purely partisan s truggle . To understand the contro­
versy over Oregon's adm i s s ion , it i s  neces sary to point out 
that the Democrats opposed Oregon ' s  t e r r i torial organiza­
tion due to its i n s i stence upon organizing a s  a free 
territory. The Whigs supported statehood i n  1 8 4 8 ;  but 
by the mid 1 8 5 0s when most Whigs had become Repu b l i cans, 
they realized that Oregon , if it was a llowed to enter the 
Union , would be a Democratic stat e . 1 4  There for e ,  wher. 
Oregon agitated for statehood , the national Democrats 
realized they could gain an ally and the national 
Repub licans realized that the territory was sympathetic 
toward s l avery although i t  remained f r e e . 15 The Democratic 
and Republican positions concerning Oregon's admission had 
comp l e t e ly reversed and the s i tuation was stalemated i n  
Congres s .  This atmosphere frustrated Oregonians who decided 
to take matters into t h e i r  own hands. 
Oregonians felt that Congress would act quicker i f  they 
had a state constitution and government apparatus set up so 
that they could present statehood as a f a i t  accomp l i .  16 On 
September 1 8 ,  1 8 5 7  Oregon boasted a state constitution that 
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outlawed both s lavery and free blacks within its borders . 
These provisions supplied an i s sue that Repub licans used 
to oppose Oregon ' s  statehood and prevent another Democratic 
state from entering the Union . On May 8 ,  1 8 5 8 ,  the Senate 
debated Oregon ' s  enabling act and on May 21 passed the 
measure by a strictly partisan vote of 3 5  to 1 7 . 1 7  The 
House did not reciprocate unt i l  February 1 2 ,  1 8 5 9 .  
President James Buchanan s igned the b i l l  on February 1 4 ,  
1 8 5 9 ,  and the Legislative Assembly accepted i t  on June 3 ,  
1 8 5 9 . The battle for Oregon ' s  statehood was long and hard­
fought,  and when the dust settled , the Oregon Democratic 
party was severely damage d .  
Ironically , Oregon ' s  admi s s ion , something that 
seemingly alJ Democrats agreed upo n ,  permanently weakened 
the party it was supposed to a i d .  Oregon ' s  leading Democrat 
and sole representative in Washington , Joseph Lan e ,  was 
exceedingly quiet during the admission debate . Asahel Bush 
did not overlook that fact in his Statesman , and soon Lane 
and Bush,  the two most powerful Oregon Democrats , were at 
odds . Bush , along with some leading c i t i z e n s ,  charged that 
Lane did not do everything possible to gain Oregon ' s  speedy 
admi s s ion to the Union . Lane , who up to this point had been 
an extremely popular politician,  fell into d i s favor with 
many Oregon voters . Indignation against Lane , now a United 
States Senator, was initiated when he sent a letter to 
Oregon ' s  Legislative Assembly that argued that the United 
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States ' territorial system was unconstitutiona1. l 8  
Accordingly , Lane deserved and received no credit for 
Oregon ' s  admission to the Union. Furthermor e ,  Lane ' s  
actions hope lessly factionali zed Oregon ' s  Democratic Party . 
The election o f  1 8 6 0  irreparably spl.it the Oregon 
Democratic party . Most Oregon Democrats adhered to Stephen 
A .  Doug l as ' popular sovereignty principle to settle the 
s l avery i s sue . Joseph Lane , however ,  agreed with President 
Buchanan ' s  faction; and , i n  fact , Lane was Buchanan ' s  
handpicked choice to succeed him. 1 9  By the summer of 1 8 59 
Lane fell completely out o f  touch with h i s  constituenc y .  
He used h i s  Senate seat to ardently support s lavery and 
the Southern viewpoint . Lane ' s  constituents felt that the 
Buchanan-Lane Democrats forced s l avery on Kansas and would 
continue to force s l avery onto other territorie s .  That 
prospect was intolerable to the independent-minded Douglas 
Democrat majority in Oregon . Even though Lane ' s  support was 
s l ipping , his faction controlled the state machinery , and 
Lane picked the Oregon delegates to the Democra t i c  national 
convention in 1 8 59 .  
Lane instructed the delegates t o  nominate him for the 
presidency , but when it was apparent that Douglas would 
receive the nomination , Lane instructed h i s  delegates to 
further his candidacy at the Baltimore convention . Lane ' s  
presidential hopes were fut i l e ,  however , to the " b itter 
d i s appointment'' of Je f ferson Dav i s . 2 0  Lane was eventually 
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nominated as the vice-presidential candidate on John C .  
Breckinridge ' s  Democratic ticket . However , his actions 
caused a storm of indignation in Oregon that resulted i n  
Democrats identifying themselves as Bush-Douglas Democrat s 
and Lane-Buchanan Democrats . 
The election o f  1 8 6 0  permanently ended Lane ' s  state and 
national political career because he had m i s j udged his 
constituency. Due to the communication d i f ficulties between 
Washington, D . C .  and the Pacific Coa s t ,  Lane fell out o f  
touch w i th his constituents ' sentiments . Orego:1ians were 
Unionists above everything, espec ially after they attained 
statehood , and Lane ' s  advocacy of the secession doctrine was 
increasingly offensive to a majority o f  his constituency. 
Lane remained in Washington during Oregon ' s  statehood move­
ment , and therefore he did not rea lize the momentum that 
movement had gained s ince his departure . Of course this 
Democratic nightmare was a Republican dream come true . 
As previously mentioned , the Democratic machine was 
solidly entrenched in Oregon from its territorial status 
through statehood. By 1 8 59,  however , the fledgling 
Republican party began to take root in Oregon , and it had 
high hopes for the 1860 presidential e lection . Oregonians 
began to identify themselves with national parties , but the 
lack of adequate communication facilities prevented Oregon 
Repub licans from remaining in close contact with the i r  
eastern counterpart s .  Also , because o f  the time anc expense 
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o f  the j ollrney eastward , only five d e legates from Oregon 
were able to attend the Republ ican national convention.  
Although the Oregon delegates were solidly behind Edward 
Bates o f  Missour i ,  Abraham Lincoln had some supporters i n  
Oregon . 
S imeon Francis first mentioned Lincoln as a 
presidential candidate in Oregon i n  February , 1 8 6 0 . 2 1  
Francis had moved from Connecticut t o  Springfield , Ill inois 
i n  1 8 3 1  where he edited two Whig newspapers , the Sangamon 
Journal and the Il linois State Journal and became a personal 
friend of Abraham Lincoln . I n  fac t ,  Lincoln had decl ined 
the job of secretary of the Oregon Territory in 1 8 4 9  
partially because he supported Franc i s  for the posi tion . 
Franc i s  moved to Portland , Oregon i n  December , 1 8 5 9  where 
he promoted the Union, the Republ i can party, and especi a l l y  
Lincoln , through h i s  editorship o f  the Portland Oregonian . 
In a letter to the Oregon Argus on February 1 1 ,  1 8 6 0 ,  
Francis d i s played acute political tact by stating he had 
a "high appreciation" for Oregon Republ ican favorite Bates , 
although privately admitting to " hating" his candidac y ,  he 
proceeded to outline Lincoln ' s  l i fe and career and urged 
his presidential nomination . 2 2  Lincoln ' s  candidacy was not 
taken seriously in Oregon at this time , however .  Oregon 
delegate s ,  a l l  but two of whom were prox i e s ,  carried their 
support for Bates to the Republ i can national convention at 
the Wigwam in Chicago on May 1 6 ,  1 8 6 0 .  
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The most influential Oregon d e l egate to the convention, 
and possibly the most influential delegate at the convention 
was New York T.ti..bJ.in..e_ editor and outspoken abolitionist 
Horace Greeley , who served as an Oregon proxy . Greeley ' s  
participation as an Oregon proxy was par ticularly iron i c .  
In 1 8 43 Greeley remarked that migration to Oregon wore an 
aspect of insanity , "  yet by 1860 he used Oregon as a vehicle 
to influence the Republican Party platform and block William 
Henry Seward ' s  pres ident ial nomination . 23 Oregon d elegate 
Greeley served on the Committee on Resolutions which drafted 
the Republican National Platform of 1 8 60 . 24 The Pla t f orm 
caused another Oregon proxy, Frank Johnson , to remark that 
it was " the most perfect and unequivocal statement of 
Republican faith ever written, the w isest and most diplo­
matic points of which I am safe in saying Oregon had the 
honor to contr ibute . " 25 Howeve r ,  Greeley ' s  most sig n i f i­
cant contribution to the convent ion was his influence in 
the nominating process . 
Greeley's actions at the convention caused one 
historian to state , " Horace G reeley b r ought about the 
nomination of Lincoln . " 20 Although this statement may 
be slightly exaggerated , it cannot be denied that Greeley's 
influence steered the convention away from Seward and toward 
L incoln. The Oregon delegates were instructed to support 
Bates , but they were also told to use the i r  best judgment in 
the event that it was obvious that his nomination could be 
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secured . 27 The delegates fol l o wed their instructions and 
cast five votes for Bates on each of the first two ballots, 
but changed their votes on the third b a l l o t .  Greeley 
observantly p ointed out to the other members of the Oregon 
de legation that Bates ' candidacy had no realistic chance to 
win the nomination. Greeley p r o ceeded to persuade three 
other Oregon delegates to j oin him in casting their votes 
for Linc o l n ,  and on the third p r e liminary ballot Oregon cast 
four votes for L i ncoln and one f o r  Sewa r d .  These four voles 
put Linc o l n  within one and one�half votes of the number 
needed to obtain the nomination, and they encou raged the 
convention's avalanche for Linc o l n ,  whose candidacy was 
eventu a l l y  made unanimous. This event was r o mant i ca l l y  
recalled b y  Frank J o hnson who beamed: 
During the third b a l l o t  there was tolerable order , 
until Oregon declared for Linco ln , rendering his 
nomination certain. At this point the enthusiasm 
become irrep ressib le; the Wigwam was shaken with 
cheers f r o m  twenty-three thousand Repu b l icans , which 
were renewed as State after State dec lared its 
unanimous vote f o r  the man who could split rails 
and mau l Democrats . 2 0 
Although O r egon did not technically "render his 
nomination certain , "  it did initiate the snowball effect f o r  
Linco l n ,  therefore the histo rically incorrect notion that 
Oregon nominated Lincoln persists . Oregonians in 1860 did 
not shy away from that hono r . 
Lincoln's nomination was met with great enthusiasm 
among Oregon Republicans , and they strongly u nited behind 
their party's candidate.20 William L. Adams, another former 
20 
Illinois resident who m igrated t o  Oregon publicly endorsed 
L i ncoln in the O regon Argus which he e d i t e d . Anson G. 
Henry , L i ncoln's o l d  f r i end f rom Spr ingf i e ld, also spoke 
on L i nco l n ' s  behal f .  Henry pointed out that L incoln was a 
frontie rsman, and t h e r e f o r e  he was f am i l ia r  w i t h  the needs 
of the Pac i f ic Coast.30 Even L incoln, who was never accused 
of be ing an op timist, spoke conf i d e n t l y  about his prospects 
for the gene r a l  p r es i d e n t i a l  e l ection in Oregon . In a 
l e t t e r  t o  S imeon Francis on August 4, 1860, L incoln comment­
ed, "I shou ld e x p ec t .  . [that' the Democ r a t i c  par ty's sp lit] 
would give us a f a i r  chance in O regon."31 L incoln's confi­
dence concerning O re gon stemmed f rom more than j us t  the 
Democratic dispar i ty in that S tat e . 
The Republican p a r t y  expanded i n  O regon by 1860, but 
i t  lacked a s trong cha r isma t i c  l eader. It needed a p e r son 
who could convince O regonians who w e r e  comp lacent w i th r u l e  
by a Democ r a t i c  machine, that the n e w  Republican party was 
the r ight choice for the i r  stat e . That leader came f rom 
California to O regon i n  the p e r son o f  Colone l Edward 
Dickinson Baker. Baker, a f o r m e r  S p r ingfi eld, I l l inois 
native and an int imat e f r iend o f  L inco ln ' s  was i nv i ted to 
O r egon by many leading Republ icans in the state including 
Dav id Logan . Bake r  a r r i ved in O r e gon i n  December 1 8 59, 
however, Logan had no d e s i r e  t o  l e t  h i m  have total control 
of the O regon Repub l ican party. This opinion was expressed 
in a l e t t e r  of January 22, 1860, which stated, "Col. Baker 
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has removed to Oregon. I think I can k e e p  the whip hand of 
the Col. Maybe not, but I w i l l  try. "3 2 
The l ist of former I l l ino i s  residents and friends 
of L inco l n  who resided in Oregon was impressive . Those 
individua l s  formed a powerfu l ,  if not harmonious group and 
included two newspaper e d i tors , S i me o n  Franc is and W i l l iam 
L. Adams, two state p o l i t icians, David Logan and Dr. Anson 
G. Henry, and L inco ln ' s  closest Oregon fr iend, and o n e  o f  
t h e  most eloquent orators o f  his t ime , Edward Baker . 
The Baker-Lincoln friendship b e gan in 1835 and grew 
through the 1840s. Despite Lincoln ' s  defeat at the hands 
of Baker for Congressman from Sangamon County i n  1844 , 
the two men had great respect for each o ther ' s  abilit ies. 
One incident in 1838 in Springf ield illustrated the ir 
friendship. L inco l n  heard Baker unintent iona l l y  antag­
onizing a most l y  Democra t ic audience through an o p e n  
scu t t l e  i n  t h e  floor of h i s  law office . Realizing that 
Baker was in physical danger, Lincoln dropped through the 
scu t tle , landed on the stage with Baker, grabb e d  a stone 
water j u g  and threatened, "I ' ll break this over the head of 
the first man who lays a hand o n  Baker! " 33 Baker finished 
h i s  speech unmolested. Lincoln continued to think so h ighly 
of Baker that he named h i s  second son Edward Baker L i ncoln 
in 1846 . No o ther man had a greater impact upon Oregon ' s  
po l i tical history from Baker's arrival in l a t e  1859 to his 
death in 1861. Baker, fresh from defeat for a Senate seat 
2 2  
from C a l i fornia i n  1 8 5 9 ,  aspired to w i n  a Senate seat from 
Oregon after his arrival in that state . 
I n  an August 1 ,  1 8 6 0  letter to Linco l n ,  Baker wrote , 
II I have a great hope of a Repub lican senator i n  
Oregon--and o f  one possibly i n  both states [California and 
Oregon] in November .  II 3 4 Bake r ' s  goa l was realized after 
the state legislatur e ,  following some abnormalitie s , elected 
Baker and James Willis Nesmi th , a Douglas Democrat , to the 
Senate . The legislature convened in Salem on September 1 0 ,  
1 8 6 0 ,  and the election process dragged on a month until 
October 2 ,  1 8 6 0 .  The election o f  Nesmith and Baker was a 
"revolution" in Oregon politic s . 3 5  The Republicans and 
Douglas Democrats combined to neutra l i z e  the Lane Democrats 
for the first time since Oregon was organized as a terri-
tory , and the Lane faction was never a major competitor for 
the new " U n ion" alliance . On the same day that Baker was 
elected he informed his friend Lincoln tha t :  
I know you w i l l  be pleased to hear that w e  have 
elected a Republican senator , Mr . Nesmith ( Doug l a s )  
and myse l f  a r e  j ust announced to be senator s .  I 
hope to see you President, and i f  I do not mistake 
you w i l l  feel that you have a true and warm friend 
at your side , who will feel for you all the attachment 
in prosperity which was nurtured in advers ity . 3 6  
The 1 8 6 0  presidential e lection was pivotal for state 
politics in Oregon. Oregon was formerly inpenetratable for 
non-Democrats,  but those barriers began to crumble by late 
1 8 6 0 .  The fusion of Douglas Democrats and Republ icans , and 
the election of Lincol n ' s  friend Baker to the Senate were 
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encouraging to Oregon Republicans. Yet ,  there remained 
considerable opposition to Lincol n .  I saac Steven s ,  Governor 
of the Washington Territory , played on popular fears in the 
region and predicted Lincol n ' s  election would precipitate 
slave uprising s ,  and that the South, from which many Oregon 
settlers had emigrated and s t i l l  sympathized with , 
threatened secession i f  Lincoln was e lected . 
The political atmosphere in Oregon was restless, 
howeve r .  Oregonians continued their perennial demands for 
home stead leg i slation and a trans-continental rai lroad which 
their Democratic representatives had f a i led to deliver to 
them. These were included in tl1e Republ ican P l atform o f  
1 8 6 0 and this attracted voters t o  that part y .  Another 
factor that solidified Oregon ' s  support for Lincoln w a s  
Baker ' s  presence in t h e  state . 3 7  The e loquent ,  persuasive 
Colonel stumped Oregon in beha l f  of h i s  old friend and 
the Union for which he stood . Although the Union-loving 
Oregonians naively thought a vote for the Breckinridge-Lane 
ticket was a vote for the Unio n ,  Lincoln won Oregon ' s  three 
electoral vote s ,  a lbeit by a scant 2 7 0  vote plurality . 
Oregonians ' growing d i s favor with the Democratic party 
caused many voters to vote for the emergent Republican 
party . Lincoln ' s  narrow margin o f  victory on the Pac i fic 
Coast caused him to remark that it was '' the closest 
po l i tical bookkeeping'' he had ever known . 3 8 Baker ' s  
persuasive oratory was crucial for his fri0nd ' s  victory 
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in Orego n . 3 9  The Oregon revolution was in full  stride 
and Joe Lane ' s  career was ende d .  
Lane ' s  defeat was a tremendous turnaround . Lane was 
formerly the most popular politician in the state . Even 
following h i s  divorce from the Bush Democrat s ,  Lane 
controlled the state machinery. However , Lane committed 
political suicide by falling out of touch with his Oregon 
constituency and endorsing the doctrine o f  secess ion . The 
doctrine o f  sece s s ion was repugnant to a n  overwhelming 
majority of Oregonians . Fol lowing Lincoln ' s  e l ection and 
the secess ion o f  the deep South, Lane used h i s  Senate seat 
to lambast the "grac e le s s , unrelenting,  and hos t i l e  
fanaticism" o f  the North whi l e  praising t h e  action o f  the 
seceded states . 40 To further illustrate Lane ' s  sympathies , 
twice he acted as Preston Brooks ' second in that Congress­
man ' s  duels with New England senators . 4 1  Howeve r ,  Lane ' s  
support for the Southern cause went beyond rhetoric . 
During the late 1 8 5 0 s  Lane had a lso advocated the 
forceful e s tablishment of an independent , sovereign Pacific 
Coast Republic . When this fact was revealed to an appalled 
Oregon c i t i z enry Lane ' s  name became synonymous with Copper­
heads and traitor s .  The idea of a separate Pacific Coast 
Republic was nothing new , and in fact it can b e  traced to 
Thomas Je fferson. Howev e r ,  the timing of Lane ' s  actions was 
horrendou s . 4 2  He pushed for Oregon ' s  independence despite 
the people ' s  intense desire for statehood . Territorial 
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Representative Lane was Oregon ' s  sole voice in Washington 
during the statehood batt l e ,  and he worked completely 
contrary to his constituency ' s  desire s .  Asahe l Bush 
exploited this opportunity to destroy h i s  former ally . 
Not only did correspondence between Lane and Territor i a l  
Governor Curry intimate Lane ' s  support for Pacific Coast 
independenc e ,  but by the sumrner of 1 8 6 0  Bush ' s  Statesman 
published documentation substantiating Lane ' s  involvement i n  
the movement. Also implicated in the seces sionist movement 
was Oregon ' s  newly e lected Governor , John Whiteaker ,  the 
Governor of C a l i forn i a ,  various Pac i f i c  Coast senator s ,  and 
the Commander of the Department of the Pacific i n  the United 
States Army. Secessionists appeared to be in control o f  the 
Paci fic Coast . 
This was the situation in Oregon that President-elect 
Abraham Lincoln inherited . Additiona l l y ,  the lower South 
had seceded, more Southern states were sure to follow, and 
a seces sionist movement on the Paci fic Coast seemed to have 
support from the region ' s  highest m i l itary and c i v i l  
officia l s . Lincoln was determined to maintain the Union . 
Howeve r ,  he was un fami l i ar with the Pacific Coast ' s  local 
authorit i e s ,  and the absence of a transcontinental tele-
graph compounded the problem. Lincoln needed a devout 
Union man , who was familiar with the Pac i f i c  Coas t ,  and 
who he could trust as an advisor and con fidant . Nobody 
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was more qualified for this j ob than the newly elected 
Senator from Oregon , Colonel Edward Dickinson Bake r .  
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I I I .  LINCOLN ' S  EARLY WAR POLICY TOWARD OREGON 
Lincol n ' s  election radica l ly a l tered Oregon ' s  po l itical 
environment by crysta l l i z ing both the Unionist and seces-
sionist movements . The vast ma j or i ty o f  Oregonians were 
unified behind Lincoln and they recog n i z ed that resi stance 
to him as a candidate was one thing , but resi stance to him 
as president was quite another . 4 3  However , there remained 
·-· 
i n  Oregon a" s i z able powerful minority that was not eager t o  
zealously support the Union.  The best i l lustration o f  this 
attitude is the amount of support for Joseph Lane ' s  Pac i f i c  
Coast Repub lic in Oregon . 
The Oregon secessionists were a s trong minority , but 
they acted covertly due to their hos t i l e  reception by the 
masses . The Knights o f  the Golden Circle was organized in 
Oregon j u st before the Civil War broke out . I t s  purpose was 
to secretly and systematically thwart Union e f forts . The 
Knigh t s ,  also known as "The Old Guard , "  and "Friends o f  
Amer i ca , "  had specific goa l s :  to d r i l l  members i n  arms 
in preparation to resist the Union , to erect a Paci fic 
Coast Repub l i c ,  and , after the War broke out, to resist 
the draft . 4 4  The Pac i f i c  Coast Repub l i c  scheme i s  an 
extraordinary story , a l though it i s  rarely to l d .  Sur-
prisingly , very few Civil War stud ies relate the story 
of Pacific Coast secessionists and their definite plan s .  
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Joseph Lane , along with other Congressmen from 
California and Washington Territor y ,  advocated an 
independent , sovereign Pacific Coast Republic that would 
work contrary to the Union and support the Confederate cause 
either directly or indirectly . 4 5  The Pac i f i c  Coast Republ i c  
would indirectly aid the Confederacy by virtue o f  separation 
from or non-cooperation with the Union . I t  would a lso be in 
a position to directly aid the Confederacy with troops and 
� ·  Llnance s .  Wealth , i n  the form o f  go l d , made Oregon and the 
Pacific Coast pivota�' for both the North and Sout h .  The 
Union and the Confederacy recognized the Pacific Coast ' s  
importance and vied for that area ' s  support . Therefore , 
when it was discovered that a secessionist scheme was in 
motion on the Pac i fic Coas t ,  the s i tuation for the Union 
was cruc i a l .  
The idea o f  a Pacific Coast Repub lic was mentioned at 
least twice during the 1 8 5 0 s . Rumors c i rculated in Oregon 
in 1 8 5 1  concerning the formation of a separate Republic , but 
the incentive was lost with the e l ection o f  Franklin Pierce 
as pres ident in 1 8 5 2 .  In 1 8 5 6  another scheme was uncovered 
when an anonymous letter revealed plans to form the Pacific 
Coast Republic . The letter was printed in the Statesman 
in September ,  1 8 5 6 . 4 6  B u t ,  by this time the idea lost 
popularity due to the Oregon statehood movement . By 1 8 6 0  
Lane had revived the Pacific Coast Republic ide a ,  and set 
his plan in motion. In the Statesman ' s  Ju ly 1 7 ,  1 8 6 0  i ssue 
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the " Lane and Gwin Conspiracy" was revea led . Joe Lane , 
along w i th Senator Will iam M .  Gwin and Senator Mi lton S .  
Latham o f  Cali fornia supported seces s ion and independence 
for the Paci fic Coast .  More detai l s  o f  the Pacific Coas t  
Republic plot were periodically revealed to a di sgusted 
Oregon constituency . The evidence published in the 
Statesman conclusively proved that armed resi stance to the 
federal government in Oregon and Ca l i fornia was planned . 
The Union i s t s  in Oregon came to grips with the fact that 
� 
their Senator was a secession i s t .  
I n  ,James G .  Blaine ' s  Twenty Years o f  Congress he wrote : 
[ After the hostilities broke out] Jefferson Davis had 
expected, with a confidence amounting to certainty , 
and based , i t  i s  be lieved , on personal pledge s ,  that 
the Pacific Coast ,  i f  it d i d  not actually j oi n  the 
South , would be d i s loyal to the Union , and wou l d ,  
from its remotene s s  and its superlative importance , 
require a large contingent o f  national forces to hold 
it i n  subjection. It was expected by the South that 
Cali fornia and Oregon would give at least as much 
trouble as Kentucky and Missour i ,  and would thus 
indirectly but powe r fully aid the Southern cause . 4 7  
The Paci fic Coast Repub l i c  would d i s tract the federa l 
government from concentrating solely on the Southern 
Confederacy , thereby weakening the national war effort . 
The Confederates had good reasons to believe this was a 
rea l i s t i c  goal . C a l i fornia Governor John G .  Downey and 
Oregon Governor John Whiteaker were both opposed to coercion 
of the South and were generally sympathetic toward the 
Confederacy . Also , a Southern sympathi z e r ,  Albert Sidney 
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Johnston commanded the Department of the Pac i fic at the time 
of Lincoln ' s  elect ion . 
On January 1 5 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  the departmen t s  o f  Cali fornia and 
Oregon were merged into the Department of the Paci fic with 
Johnston comrnanding . 4 8  This vast department included all of 
C a l i fornia,  Oregon , Washington Territor y ,  parts o f  western 
Utah, and western New Mexico . The Department of the Pacific 
was broken down into several districts ,  of which , one was 
the District of Oregon.  Rumors concerning Johnston ' s  
� -inf ide l i  ty toward ·the Union were widely circulated , but 
General Winfield J .  Scott , General-in-Chief o f  the United 
States Army, dismissed them as false. Undoubted l y ,  
secession i sts ' entrenchment in power ful Pac i f i c  Coast 
military and civil of fices had the potential to work in 
the Confederacy ' s  favor. However , Edward Baker was a keen 
observer , and he was well aware of the secessioni sts '  
scheme. 
Baker left Oregon for Washington , D . C .  by way o f  San 
Francisco and Panama in early November , 1 8 6 0 .  After 
delivering the most famous address of h i s  career before 
j ourneying eastward, Baker took h i s  Senate seat on December 
5 ,  1 8 6 0 .  Oddly enough, Baker was a t  one time the only Whig 
Congressman from I l linoi s ,  and in 1 8 6 0  he was the only 
Republican Congressman from the entire Pacific Coast . 4 9  
Lincoln summoned Baker to meet with h im in Spring f i e ld soon 
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after Baker arrived in Washington, D . C . , and the Oregon 
Senator met with his old friend in l ate Decembe r ,  1 8 6 0 .  
The meeting between the Republ ican Senator from Oregon 
and the President-elect marked the beginning of Lincol n ' s  
pol i cy toward Oregon. Although there i s  no record o f  what 
transpired during the meeting , it is logical to assume that 
affairs in Oregon received some cons ideration. S O  Another 
pertinent fact i s  that Baker was in favor o f  the immediate 
removal of Brevet Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston 
.,· 
from command o f  the Department o f  the Pacific . Baker had 
incessantly made this point c lear to Lincoln by the time he 
assumed the presidency, therefore it i s  natural to assume 
that Lincoln learned o f  Baker ' s  pos i t ion on this i s s ue 
during thei� Oece�ber meeting . But ,  Lincoln could not act 
until he had the power to do so three months later i n  March, 
1 8 6 1 .  
Powerless , Lincoln adopted his "watchful waiting" 
policy while he remained in Springf i e ld . Lincoln had a 
strong faith in southern Union sentiment , and he believed 
the sece s s ionists would reverse themselves in a matter o f  
time . But , Lincoln ' s  patience was interpreted by Oregon ' s  
Douglas Democrats as ind i f ferenc e ,  and even ineptness . 
These attitudes did not change following Lincoln ' s  
inauguration on March 4 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  despite the fact that he 
was introduced by Senator Bake r .  James Wi l l i s  Nesmith, 
the Douglas Democrat elected Senator with Bake r ,  wrote a 
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b l i stering critique o f  Lincoln on March 1 8 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  in which 
he stated : 
It i s  already demonstrated that an inherant [ sic]  
weakness pervades our government which in the end 
w i l l  be i t s  rui n .  I n  other times o f  trial that 
weakness had in some degree been compensated by 
the strength o f  the executive head , but that quality 
so very much needed has not o f  late been sought for 
in presidential candidate s .  The people have become 
in factuated with the notion that some damned old fool 
who drank cide r ,  skinned coon s ,  ran a flatboat , cut 
cordwood or made rai l s  was the very man to be placed 
in the last position where those qual i fications were 
required . . Whilst Lincoln and h i s  cabinet seem 
undetermined , the Republ i c  i s  falling to pieces, 
and Je f f  Dav i s ,  a man o f  great executive mind , and 
experience i s  rapidly r,jnsolidating h i s  strength, 
and establishing his Southern Con federac y . 5 1  
Mr . Nesmith ' s  harsh critique was somewhat erroneou s .  
Fol lowing Lincoln ' s  inauguration , Baker repeated the urgency 
of replacing Johnston , but Lincoln had gained confl ic�ing 
in formation from another reliable source . General Scott , 
a friend o f  Johnston ' s  and an ardent Unionist , vigorously 
affirmed Johnston ' s  loyalty . Therefore ,  the issue was 
deadlocked . Two highly reliable sources respectfully 
d i ffered , but neither Baker nor Scott had proof to sub-
stantiate their claim s .  Meanwh i l e ,  Lincoln was informed 
of the situation on the Pacific Coast . 
Stephen J .  Field , Chief Justice o f  the California State 
Supreme Court , and other loyal Pac i f i c  Coast citizens 
monitored the situation and communicated their observations 
to Lincoln . 5 2  The actions of Judge F i e ld and the other 
loyal communicants were secretive , therefore Nesmith was 
unaware that Lincoln was taking action concerning the 
3 3  
Pac i fi c  Coas t .  I n  fact , Field ' s  actions were so secretive 
that his work was not revealed until he mentioned it in h i s  
unpubl i shed book , Early Days i n  Ca l i fornia . However , no 
concrete proof of Johnston ' s  infidelity was obtained , and 
Linco l n ,  though doing a l l  he could about the situation , 
could not remove Johnston without substantiating h i s  
dec i sion . The evidence that Lincoln needed came j ust 
eighteen days after he took the presidential oat h .  
James Nesmith, the man who lambasted Lincoln for his 
ineptne s s ,  was due to take his Senate seat on March 4 ,  1 8 6 1 .  
Nesmith departed from Oregon early and s tayed i n  San 
Francisco for three weeks before he departed for Washington , 
D . C. Nesmith ' s  Democratic background enabled him t o  speak 
freely with Brevet-Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston 
at his San Francisco headquarters .  Johnston revealed that 
he retained command of the Department o f  the Pacific because 
he thought he " could render the Confederate cause greater 
service in the position he then held than in any other he 
could assume . 11 5 3  Johnston e laborated on h i s  plan and 
con firmed that Southerners counted on the Pacific Coa s t  
governme nt ' s  sympathy for the Confederac y ' s  succe s s . 
Johnston was obviously unaware thac Nesmith was e lected as a 
direct result o f  h i s  party ' s  coalition with the Republicans , 
and that Nesmith was a staunch Union man . Nesmith remained 
mute about his discovery during h i s  long voyage to Washing­
ton as he planned to thwart the secession i s t s '  p J ans . 
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N e s m i t h  s o u g h t  P r e s i d e n t  L i n c o l n  and S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S t a t e  W i l l i am H .  S e w a r d  immed i a t e l y  u p o n  h i s  a r r i v a l  i n  t h e  
n a t i on ' s  c a p i t a l . T h e  O r e g o n  S e n a t o r  f a i t h f u l l y d i vu lged 
h i s i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  J o hn s t o n ' s  p l an s  t o  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  o n  M a r c h  2 2 ,  1 8 6 1 . 5 4 L a t e r  t ha t  d a y  S e w a r d  
r e l a ted t o  Ge n e r a l  W i n f i e ld S c o t t  w h a t  N e s m i t h  t o l d h i � .  
G e n e r a l  E r a s m u s  D .  K e y e s ,  p r i va t e  m i l i t a r y  s e c r e t a r y  t o  
Gen e r a l  S c o t t , n a r r at e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
.,� 
H r .  Seward r e m a r ked , i n  s t r i c t  c o n f i d e n c e , t hat h e  had 
r e c e ived i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  a h i g h  s o u r c e  t h a t  Ge n e r a l  
A l b e r t  S id n e y  J o hn s o n  [ s i c ]  command e r  o f  t h e  d ep a r t m e n t  
o f  t h e  Pa c i f i c ,  w a s  u n f a i t h f u l  t o  t he U n i o n . S e n a t o r  
N e s m i t h  o f  O r e g o n , w a s  H r .  S e w a r d ' s  i n f o r m a n t .  A f t e r  
a l o n g  d i s c u s s i o n  i t  w a s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  s e n d  m e  [ K e y e s ]  
t o  t h e  P a c i f i c  C o a s t  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  m a t t e r s  t h e r e . I 
s h o u l d  c a r r y  o r d e r s  i n  my p o c k e t ,  t o  be u s ed a t  my own 
d i s c r e t i o n  t o  s e n d  Gen e r a l  J o hn s o n  [ s i c ]  t o  W a s h i n g t o n  
and t o  d e v o l v e  h i s  command o n  C o l o n e l  George W r i g h t . 5 5 
L i n c o l n  m o v e d  q u i c k l y  and d e c i s i v e l y  a f t e r  h e a r i n g  
N e s m i t h ' s  e v i d e n c e . T he s i t u a t i o n ' s  u rg e n c y  w a s  e v i d e n t  
when o n  H a r c h  2 2 ,  L in c o l n  o r d e r e d  B r igad i e r  Ge n e r a l  E d w i n  V .  
S u m n e r , i n s t e ad o f  K e y e s , t o  " p r e p a r e  t o  s a i l  f r o m  N e w  Y o r k  
t he f i r s t  o f  n e x t  m on t h  [ Ap r i l ]  t o  r e l i e v e  B r e v e t - B r igad i e r  
Gen e r a l  J o h n s t o n  i n  command o f  t h e  P a c i f i c  D e p a r t m e n t , "  b u t  
t h e  o r d e r  " r e m a i n e d  u n p u b l i s h e d , "  u n t i l  h e  w a s  " on t h e  
P a c i f i c  O c e a n , f o r  c o n f i d e n t i a l  r e a s o n s . " T h e  o r d e r  was 
s i gned by L i n c o l n ' s  f i r s t  m i l i t a r y  l i e u t e n an t . 5 e In o r d e r  
t o  i n s u r e  t h e  m i s s i o n ' s  s e c r e c y ,  S u m n e r  was r o w ed o u t  t o  
t h e  s t e am e r  a f t e r  i t  w e n t  d o w n  t h e  B a y  o f  N e w  Y o r k ,  t o  
o u t w i t  r e p o r t e r s . 57 L i n c o ln w a n t e d  abs o l u t e  s e c r e c y  s o  
t h a t  J o h n s t o n  w o u l d b e  s o  s u r p r i s e d  w h e n  S u m n e r  a r r i v e d  
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t o  r e l i e v e  h i m ,  t h a t  h e  c o u l d  n o t  o r gan i z e  a p o s s i b l e  
r e b e l l i o n .  Ge n e r a l  S c o t t  f a c e d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  J o hn s t o n  was 
a s e c e s s i o n i s t  who a l s o  c o n sp i r e d  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s hm e n t  of 
an i n d e p e n d e n t  P ac i f i c C o a s t  Rep u b l i c  and h e  i s s u ed an o r d e r  
f o r  h i s  a r r e s t . 
T h e  s e c e s s i o n i s t ' s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  a l e r t  J o h n s t on a b o u t  
h i s  r e l i e f  o r d e r s  b e f o r e  S u m n e r  a r r ived d e s p i t e  t h e  
p a i n s t a k i n g  e f f o r t s  t o  i n s u r e  t h e  s e c r e c y  o f  S u m n e r ' s  
m i s s i o n . J o hn s t o n  :., t h e r e f o r e , r e s i g n e d  and a s k e d  t o  b e  
r e l ieved o n  Ap r i l  9 ,  1 86 1 .  S u m n e r  a r r ived i n  San F r a n c i s c o  
o n  Ap r i l  24 , and t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d a y  h e  handed J o hn s t o n  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t ' s  o r d e r s  and s a i d , " I  a m  i n  command o f  t h e  D e p a r t ­
me n t . "  15 B  A l o y a l  o f f i c e r  c o m m a n d e d  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  
P a c i f i c  and t h e  a d v o c a t e s  o f  a P a c i f i c  C o a s t  Re p u b l i c  
c h a m p i o n e d  a l o s t  c a u s e . 15 9 A l t h o u g h  C o p p e r head i s m ,  a s  
exp r e s s e d t h r o u g h  t h e  Kn i g h t s  o f  t he G o l d e n  C i r c l e  d i d 
n o t  d i e  c o mp l e t e l y  i n  O r eg o n , t h e  s e c e s s i o n i s t  m o v e m e n t 
w a s  p r o f ou n d l y  w e a k e n e d  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  L i n c o l n ' s  a c t i o n s . 
H o w ev e r ,  a n o t h e r  even t ,  s i m u l t an e o u s  w i t h  J o h n s t o n ' s  r e l i e f ,  
c e m e n t e d u n i o n  s e n t i m e n t  i n  O r e g o n . 
T he n e w s  o f  F o r t  S u m t e r ' s  f a l l  a r r i v ed i n  S a n  F r a n c i s c o  
o n  t h e  s a m e  d a y  a s  G e n e r a l  S u mn e r ,  Ap r i l  24 , 1 8 6 1 . 00 T h e  
n e w s o f  S u m n e r  and S u m t e r  w e r e  s h o t s  o f  ad r e n a l i n e  f o r  the 
U n i o n  cause i n  O r e go n . O m i n o u s l y ,  t h e  same s h i p  t h a t  
r e t u r n e d  L a n e  t o  O r eg o n , i n  l a t e  A p r i l ,  1 8 6 1 ,  a l s o  b r o u g h t  
t h e  n e w s  o f  S u m t e r ' s  f a l l .  F o r t  S u m t e r ' s  f a l l  j e l l e d  U n i on 
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s e n t i m e n t  i n  O r e g o n  and m a n y  O r e g o n i an s  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  
S o u t h  i n i t i a t e d  t h e  w a r ,  d e t e s t e d  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  s e c e s s ion 
and supp o r t e d  the U n i o n . 0 1  J o s e p h  L a n e ' s  r e t u r n  i l l u s t r a t ed 
t h e  O r e gon i a n s ' s e n t i m e n t .  Lane w a s  a s e c e s s i o n i s t ,  and 
O r e gon i a n s  f e l t  t h a t  o t h e r s  l i ke h i m  w e r e  t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  p r o b l e m s . P r e v i o u s l y ,  i n  a s p e e c h  t o  t h e  S e n a t e , 
L a n e  s t a t e d , "I k n o w  l o ng , w e l l ,  and i n t i m a t e l y "  t h e  p e o p l e  
o f  O r egon , and t h e y  wou ld r e f u s e  t o  f i g h t  a f r a t r i c i d a l  w a r  
ag a i n s t  t h e  S o u t h !  L a n e  m i s j u dged t h e  O r eg o n i an s .  A s  a 
r e s u l t ,  O r egon i an s  r e c e i v e d  L a n e  f r i g id l y ,  a n d  t r e a t e d  h i m  
a s  t h e  t r a i t o r  t h a t  h e  w a s . L a n e  had a c t u a l l y b r o u g h t  t h r e e  
b o x e s  o f  a r m s  w i t h  h i m  t o  f ig h t  f o r  t h e  P ac i f i c  C o a s t  
R e p u b l i c ,  b u t  h e  w a s  d i s s u ad e d  f r o m  u s i n g  t h e m  b y  a 
p r o m i n e n t  c i t i z e n , J e s s e  App l e g a t e . 0 2 
T h e e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  O r e g o n  a f t e r  F o r t  S u m t e r ' s  f a l l  w a s  
summed up i n  a l e t t e r  f r om D r . A n s o n  H e n r y  t o  L i n c o l n  on 
J u n e  2 1 ,  1 86 1 ,  s t a t i n g :  
T h e r e  i s  a s t r on g e r  s e c e s s i on f e e l i n g  h e r e  t h a n  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e d . I n  my o p i n i o n t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  
B a k e r  and N e s m i t h t o  t h e  S e n a t e , and t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  
d e f e a t  o f  B r e c k i n r id g e  and L a n e  i n  O r eg o n  i n  N o v e m b e r  
i s  a l l  t h a t  saved t h i s  c o a s t  f r o m  g o i n g  w i t h  t h e  S o u t h .  
- - As i t  w a s  - t h e  t im e l y  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  G e n . S u m n e r  a t  
San F r an c i s c o ,  saved t h e  pu b l i c p r o p e r t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  
f r o m  f a l l i n g  i n t o  t h e  hands o f  t h e  S e c e s s i on i s t s . I 
t h i n k  a l l  i s  n o w  s a f e  n o t  w i t hs t a n d i n g  t h e  g o v e r n o r s  o f  
b o t h  C a l i f o r n i a  and O r e g o n  o p e n l y  avow t h e i r  h o s t i l i t y 
t o  y o u r  p o l i c y  o f  p u t t i n g  d o w n  t h e  r e b e l l i on . 0 3 
L a n e ' s  s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n  a l s o s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  B u s h -
D o u g l a s D e m o c r a t  - R e p u b l i c a n  c o a l i t i o n , w h i c h  w a s  l a t e r  
c a l l e d  t h e  " U n i o n "  p a r t y . a 4 H o s t  O r eg o n i an s  a r d e n t ly 
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supported Lincoln ' s  vigorous prosecution o f  the war . 
Oregon ' s  Governor John Whiteaker, e lected in 1 8 5 8 ,  was a 
glaring exception to pub l i c  sentiment .  I n  1 8 57, v i s ionary 
Asahel Bush prophe sied, "The people o f  Oregon are eminently 
national in their sentiments and attachments, and whether 
she enters the Union slave or free, she w i l l  be a conserva-
tive National Stat e ,  and in every emergency w i l l  stand by 
the Union and the Constitution as they are.  11 6 5  Bush ' s  
prediction was correct ,  but Whiteaker failed to heed the 
advice . Followinc the Oregon Union Party ' s  cohes ion , 
. ... 
everyone who remained outside of this coalition , including 
Lane ' s  treasonable Democratic faction of which Whiteaker 
was a part , was considered a Copperhead and a traitor . 
Whiteaker ' s  action did l it t le to d i sprove this general-
ization . 
Immed iately after the news of Fort Sumter reached 
Oregon , Whiteaker condemned the policy of " coercion" aga inst 
the Sout h .  I n  h i s  "Address to the People o f  Oregon, " on May 
2 8, 1 8 6 1, Whiteaker argued that the South would never stop 
fighting short of victory and that Oregon should not involve 
itself with the eastern struggle . Whiteaker argued that 
Oregon ' s  geographical location exempted i t  from partic ipa-
t i ng in the war, and he a l so offered a more impass ioned 
plea . Whiteaker reasoned that Oregon ' s  settlers emigrated 
from many d i f ferent sections of the United States , and "it 
would certainly be impolitic for u s ,  however keen l y  we may 
3 8  
sympathize with other sections , to subj ect ourselves to 
the calamities which afflict them . "  He accused the federal 
government of pursuing a war to end s lavery , and pleade d ,  
"Have a care that i n  freeing the negro you d o  not enslave 
the white man . 11 6 6  
After pleading w i th the Oregonians , Whiteaker unleased 
his invective upon Lincoln ' s  admini s t ration . Whiteaker 
referred to the War as Lincoln ' s  "wicked and unnatural War 
upon the South . "  The Governor also c learly stated that 
Lincoln would receive no troops from Oregon to carry o� his 
" fratricidal war . 11 6 7  Whiteaker made that remark j u s t  forty-
three days after Lincoln ' s  iPitial c a l l  for 7 5 , 0 0 0  ... 
volunteer s .  Whiteaker ' s  popularity , a lready fall ing , 
plummeted after he pub licized h i s  unpopular positiou. 
The Jacksonville Sentine l ,  a newspaper in southern Oregon , 
reviewed Whiteaker ' s  speech by saying the governor was 
" evidently in a quandary , his v iews are conflicting and h i s  
mind goes wandering as he puts h i s  p e n  to paper . 11 6 8  The 
Argus simply dismi ssed the governor as the "biggest ass 
in the state . 11 6 9  
Mos t  regular army troops stationed in Oregon were 
transferred to California or the east at the War ' s  outset . 
By summer ,  1 8 6 1 ,  only about 7 0 0  regulars and nineteen 
comm i s s ioned o f ficers were stationed in Oregon and the 
Washington Territory . 7 0 However , Governor Whiteaker did 
not complain to the federal government that his state was 
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i n ad e qu a t e l y  g u a r d ed , a l t h o u g h  f e a r s  of I n d i a n  a t t acks and 
Copp e r h e ad r e b e l l i o n s  w e r e  u b i q u i t o u s  and w e l l - f ou n d e d . 
W h i t e a k e r ' s  comp l a c e n cy i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  was a l m o s t  t re a s o n -
ab l e ,  and B u s h ' s  Statesman q u i p p e d  t h a t  W h i t e ak e r  w a s  t o o  
busy " f id d l i n g "  f o r  J e f f e r s o n  D a v i s  a n d  t o o  a f r a i d  of 
c o r re s p o n d e n c e  w i t h a Repu b l i c an ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 1 F i n a l l y ,  
C o l o n e l  George W r ig h t , Command e r  o f  t h e  D is t r i c t  o f  O r egon , 
a t t em p t ed t o  s e c u r e  O r egon ' s  n e g l e c t e d  f r on t i e r . 
I n  J u n e  1 86 1 ,  C o l o n e l  W r ig h t  r e q u i s i t i o n ed W h i t e a k e r  
f o r  a t h r e e  y e a r  c a v a l r y  comp an y .  W h i t e a k e r  r e sp o n d e d  b y  
app o i n t ing f e l l ow C o pp e r head A .  P .  D e n n i s o n  a s  r e c r u i t i n g  
• 
o f f i c e r , and h i s  i n e r t i a  e f f e c t i v e l y  n e u t r a l i z ed W r i g h t ' s  
p l an . T h e  L i n c o l n  adm i n i s t r a t i o n , i n f o rmed o f  Gove r n o r  
W h i t e a ke r ' s  e f f e c t ive v e t o  o f  W r i g h t ' s  requ i s i t i o n , moved 
d e c i s iv e l y  t o  r e c t i fy O r egon ' s  p r o b l e m . 
On S e p t e m b e r  24 , 1 8 6 1 ,  a n  " un u s u a l  i f  n o t  
u n p a r a l l e l e d "  o r d e r  w a s  i s s u ed t h r o u g h  Adj u ta n t  Gen e r a l  
L o r e n z o  T homas . T he o r d e r  was add r e s s ed t o  t h r e e  l o y a l  
O r egon c i v i l i an s : r e t i red C o l o n e l  T h o m a s  R .  C o r n e l iu s , 
H o n o r a b l e  B e n j a m i n  F .  H ar d i n g ,  and Reuben F .  H au r y . Li n c o l n  
r e a l i z e d  h e  had t o  bypass t h e  C o p p e r h e ad con t r o l l ed O r egon 
s t a t e  governmen t i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  O r egon t r o o p  r e c r u i t s .  
L i n c o ln appo i n t e d  C o l o n e l  Thomas C o r n e l iu s  a s  r ec r u i t i n g  
o f f i c e r  and d i r e c t e d  h i m  t o  r a i s e  o n e  c a v a l r y  r e g i m e n t t o  
c on s i s t  of t e n  compan i e s  f o r  t h r e e  y e a r s  s e r v i c e .  T h e  o r d e r  
w a s  l a t e r  mod i f i e d  t o  d e s ig n a t e  o n l y  s i x  fu l l  c o m p an i e s  f o r  
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the regiment . 
Cava lry . 7 2  
The regiment was known a s  the First Oregon 
The Oregon situation ' s  urgency was re flected i n  the 
almost frantic recruiting method that the order adumbrate d .  
Harding was appointed regimental Quartermaster , who would be 
"Mustered into the service immed iately upon receipt of this 
letter by an a rmy o f ficer in his vicinity . "  But , i f  there 
was no army officer in his vicinity , Harding would "muster 
himse l f  into the service by taking the oath of a l legiance 
before a civil magistrate . '' The order ' s  most amazing aspect 
was the amount of power it granted to the three former 
c iv i l i ans . The order n�1u lously stated that the regiment 
was formed to meet a l l  exigencies , espec i a l ly in protecting 
the Oregon frontier , but : 
Owing to the great distance between Washington 
and Oregon, these instructions must necessarily be 
general ,  but the Department , acting upon the strong 
recommendation of the Hon . E. D. Baker, Senator from 
Oregon , relies confidently upon the prudence , 
patriotism, and economy with which you wi l l  execute 
this trust . Unless otherwise ordered you w i l l  be 
governed by any directions sent to you by Co l .  E. D .  
Baker . . .  7 3  
The Johnston a ffair convinced Lincoln that Baker was 
acutely aware of the loyalty and d i s l oyalty of those on 
the Pacific Coa s t .  Therefore , when the recruitment problem 
surfaced it was apparent that Lincoln followed Baker ' s  
advice to form the First Oregon Cavalry for Oregon ' s  state 
secur i ty . Lincoln ' s  bold order , i s sued through Adjutant 
General Thomas illustrated the president ' s  intense desire 
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t o  retain Oregon in the Union despite the non-cooperation o f  
i t s  state government . Lincol n ' s  Oregon patronage appointees 
followed a similar pattern . 
The nation ' s  crisis magnified the importance o f  making 
sound federal appointee s .  Lincoln ' s  task for f i l l ing 
vacated office s ,  removing seces sioni s t s ,  and e f ficiently 
placing competent officials in thei r  proper p l aces was 
acutely more d i f ficult than any other pres ident ' s .  I f  
sece s s ionists were a l lowed t o  keep their governmental 
posit i ons , as Albert Sidney Johnston a lmost d i d ,  the 
government ' s  e ffectiveness in crushing the rebel lion would 
have been hopelessly reduce d .  There for e ,  Lincoln had to 
·•'' 
depend more than eve·r on trustworthy advisors to help him 
make proper selections in sections with which he was 
unfam i l iar . For this reason, Lincoln knew he could give 
Baker a virtual " free hand" in recommending the appointment 
of federal o f ficeho lders in Oregon , and C a l i forni a ,  without 
fear . o f  secessioni sts ' infiltration. 
Lincoln asked Baker to provide him with a list o f  
potential appointees for o f fices i n  Oregon . Baker 
faithfully re sponded on Apri l  8 ,  1 8 6 1  and suggested B .  J .  
Pengra as Surveyor Genera l ,  and on June 1 3  he completed h i s  
l i s t  of suggestion s :  W i l l iam T .  Matlock , Receiver a t  Oregon 
City ; W i l l iam A. Starkweathe r ,  Registrar of the Land Office 
at Oregon City ; John Kelly , Registrar at Roseburg ; Will iam 
H .  Rector , Superintendent of Indian Affairs ; Will iam 
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Barnh a r t ,  Indian Agen t ;  William Logan , Indian Agent at Warm 
Springs Reservation; and Charles Hutch ins , Indian Agent at 
Uma t i l l a  Reservation. Lincoln approved Baker ' s  suggestions 
and made the appointments as l i sted. 7 4  Lincoln also 
appointed Thomas J.  Dryer , former editor of the Oregonian , 
as Commi ssioner to Hawa i i  on March 2 0 ,  1 8 6 1 .  Dryer ran into 
some oppo s ition,  howeve r ,  and Lincoln replaced him with 
James McBride , another Oregonian , on January 2 6 ,  1 8 6 3 . 7 5  
W i l l iam H .  Bennet was appointed Marshal o f  Oregon o n  Apr i l  
1 0 ,  1 8 6 2  a t  the request o f  Simeon Franc i s . 7 6  
D r .  E l i j a h  White was appointed Oregon ' s  general 
supervisor of Indians . Wh i t e  had an unusual ass ignment 
from Li�coln . White proposed an �ndustrial scheme for 
Oregon ' s  Indian s ,  and Lincoln approved the plan . He arrived 
in Oregon in 1 8 6 1 ,  found his plan was impracticable due to 
the amount of Indians that died in the area, and soon 
afterward White returned to Cal i fornia . 7 7  A .  A. Bancroft 
was appoint-ed Indian Agent at the Simcoe Reserva tion ; 
Captain A .  P .  Ankeny , Surveryor o f  the Port o f  Portland ; A . 
R .  F l i n t ,  John T .  Hami lton , Charles I .  Parke r ,  and R .  S .  
Partlow were appointed postmasters at Roseberg,  S a lem , 
Astor i a ,  and Oregon C i ty respectively . Wi l l iam Tichenor and 
E .  P .  Drum were appointed collectors at Portland and Urnpqua 
respective-y; and Joel Bur l i ngame , Postal Agent for Oregon . 
Lincoln a l so appointed Thomas Frazar to the important post 
of Col lector of Internal Revenue at Portland ; Lawrence w .  
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Coe,  Collector of Revenue ; and Will iam L.  Adams , editor of 
the Argu s ,  as col lector a t  Astoria . 7 8  Owen Wade replaced 
Starkweather on March 1 7 ,  1 8 65 as Reg i s trar of the Land 
Office at Oregon C i ty a fter Starkweather r e s igned . 7 9  
Baker ' s  i n f luence with Lincoln concerning federal 
appointments in Oregon and California was contested in 
some cases , however . 
David Logan communicated his d i sappointment to Lincoln 
concerning his rebuff from the presiden t ' s  federal appointee 
l i s t . In a letter to Lincoln on September 5 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  Logan 
moaned , "Every man this [Lincoln] administration has 
appointed to o ffice in Oregon save one are favorites of Col .  
Baker , and they have i�s t i tuted against me , politically and ·! � 
personally publicly and in my private a f fairs a sys tem o f  
most annoying warfar e ,  hoping since I have done the work 
for the party to work me out and have the coast clear for 
them . 11 8 0  Linco ln , unimpressed,  purposely did not appoint 
Logan to an office . Lincoln reportedly inferred that he 
would appoint Judge Stephen T .  Loga n ,  David ' s  father , to 
any o f f ice he wanted ; but , he would never appoint David to 
an o f f ice . Lincoln ' s  l ater appointments included some o f  
his cronie s .  I n  1 8 6 2  he appointed Simeon Franc i s  and D r .  
Anson G .  Henry to the posts o f  Army Paymaster and Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs for the Washington Territory 
respectively. B l  
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I t  i s  relevant i n  t h e  d i scussion o f  Lincoln ' s  federal 
appointments to ask why Baker was not selected as a cabinet 
member .  I t  was the consensus o f  opinion that Baker would 
receive a cabinet post during his meet i ng with President­
e lect Lincoln in Spring fie l<l in late December , 1 8 6 0 .  
Indee d ,  David Wilmot of Pennsylvania who accompanied Baker 
to the meeting was o f fered a cabinet position , but turned 
it down . Baker ' s  biographers explained that the " apparent 
s l ight" was probably due to Lincoln ' s  need for support in 
the Senate from the Pacific Coast states . 8 2  In fac t ,  Baker 
turned down more than j u s t  a cabinet position in order to 
give Lincoln Senate suppor t .  On May 1 7 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  L i ncoln 
offered Baker a Brigadier Genera l ' s  commission , but Baker 
declined it as he later declined Lincoln ' s  o f fer of a Major 
General ' s  cow� i s sion in order to retain h i s  Senate seat . 8 3  
Baker ' s  Senate support for Lincoln came to an abrupt 
end , however . Baker retained his colone l ' s  ran k ,  which 
al lowed him to keep his Senate seat , formed a volunteer 
regimen t ,  and was ki l led in action leading troops at the 
Battle of Ba l l ' s  Bluff on October 2 1 ,  1 8 6 1 .  Lincoln wept 
when he received the news about his longtime frien d . 8 4  
Oregon lost i t s  first Republ i can Senator , and Lincoln lost 
a close fr iend and an invaluable adv i sor . 
however, did not shed a tea r .  
John Whiteaker , 
Whiteaker replaced Baker with an overt secession i s t ,  
Benjamin Stark . Mr . Stark ' s  appointment was accompanied 
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by a petition from some Oregon c i t i zens asking that the 
appointment not be approve d .  The petition,  addressed to 
Secretary of State Wi l l iam H .  Seward read in part : 
Mr . Stark has expressed himse l f  pub l i c l y .  . as the 
most prominent and bold of the advocates of secession 
here in this state . He has been selected by Gov . 
Whiteaker doubtless in consequence of  h i s  secession 
procl ivities,  thus outraging sentiment of the people 
o f  Oregon , a large majority o f  whom are loyal to the 
Union . B S 
The Senate accepted Stark ' s  nomination after some 
hesitancy , but he was isolated by h i s  Senate colleagues .  
Stark ' s  appointment exemp l i fied Whiteaker ' s  a t titude . The 
governor ' s  non-cooperation with the Lincoln administration 
was most obvious in regard to troop recruitment within 
Oregon . 
On January 3 ,  1 8 6 2 ; Adjutant General Thomas requested 
some in formation from Governor Whiteaker concerning troop 
strength in Oregon . The request asked the governor to 
report to the Secretary of War the number of  volunteer 
regiments organized under the authority of the Oregon state 
government ,  and their status upon being transferred to the 
general government . Thomas a lso deli cately referred to the 
First Oregon Cavalry , formed without the governor ' s  consent , 
as " independent acceptances" and desired a report concerning 
" it s ,  and any other independent regiment ' s  strength . 11 8 6  The 
war Department ' s  motivations behind i ssuing this request are 
puz z l ing . The Lincoln administration obviously recognized 
Whiteakcr ' s  host i l ity toward furnishing troops for the Union 
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cause and i t  was this that forced t h e  president to bypass 
the state government and resort to " independent accep-
tances . "  I f  the War Department ' s  motivation was to confirm 
Whiteaker ' s  hos t i lity toward the Union War e f fort , the 
Oregon governor ' s  retort to the War Department cleared up 
any indecis ion concerning his posi tion . 
Whiteaker ' s  non-cooperative attitude was apparent in 
the wording of his reply . Whiteaker ' s  opening sentence to 
the War Department read , "Your communication of January 4 ,  
1 8 6 2 .  i s  received and without delav I make the followina � � 
reply : The authorities o f  this state have never been cal led 
upon for any troops by the President . "  Although this was an 
obvious di stortion of the trut h ,  Whiteaker explained that 
Wright ' s  requisition for troops was " countermanded "  before 
... the company was muster�d into service . Whiteaker understood 
Thomas ' subtle inquiry concerning the '' independent accep-
tances"  regiment Harding recruited without the governor ' s  
consent . In reference to that regiment ' s  situation , 
Whiteaker sarcastically noted : 
. the authorities of this state [have not]  
furnished any volunteers upon what you call 
' independent acceptances , '  unless i t  i s  meant 
by this to cover those cases where officers for 
the c ommand of a regiment have been appointed 
directly from your office,  and authorized to 
raise such troops within a State without call ing 
upon the local authorities for them. As you must 
be aware , there is one such case in this State , 
but as to its present strength I am entirely 
unin formed .  . 11 8 7  
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On May 2 1 ,  1 8 6 2 , Whiteaker punctuated this statement in a 
reply to a similar inquiry from Secretary o f  war Edwin M .  
Stanton in which the governor stated , "There i s  not a figure 
or the scratch of a pen in the (Oregon] executive office 
which would enable me to answer your inquirie s . 11 8 8  In 
fact , Whiteaker ' s  actions countermanded Lincoln ' s  e f forts 
to retain Oregon i n  the Union so much that the governor 
indirectly encouraged foreign intervention . 
Rumors frequently c irculated in Oregon that the English 
encouraged the separation of the Pac i f i c  Coast from the 
Union . Advocates o f  the Pacific Coast Republic based their 
philosophy partia lly on the argument that the Pac i f i c  
Coas t ' s  trade would b e  more profitabl e i f  i t  were indepen­
dent from the Union. 8 9  Thi s  argument and the outbreak o f  
the Civil War whetted the Engl ish appetite . On� January 1 1 ,  
1 8 6 2 , the Jacksonville Sentinel reprinted an article from 
the British Columbia British Colonist which described how a 
force of British Canadians planned to sweep into the P a c i f i c  
Coa s t , " and combined with the 7 5 , 0 0 0 Secessionists i n  Oregon 
and Cali fornia , "  they would separate the Pacific States from 
the Union and possibly hold the area under English "pro­
tection . "  The Sentinel ran the article under the sarcastic 
title , "What the British Expect o f  the Secessionists in 
Oregon in case of War , "  and further quipped, " i f  the 
Colonist will be kind enough to wait a l i t t le whi le be fore 
taking possession o f  Oregon and C a l i forn i a ,  we sha ll feel 
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ourselves under everlast ing obligations . 11 9 0  The Sentinel 
could a f ford the sarcasm because despite Whiteaker ' s  actions 
the majority o f  Oregonians were Union i s t s  and Lincoln was 
determined to hold on to them. Besides , the estimation o f  
7 5 , 0 0 0  secessionists in j u s t  Oregon was probably an 
exaggeration . 
Oregon ' s  unprotected coast line caused d e fense 
problems , however .  Lincoln realized t h i s  defic iency in 
Oregon and other places ,  and he moved quickly to fort i fy 
the coast . Lincoln ' s  costal fortificat ion policy was 
addressed to the governors of seaboard and l i kes ide states 
and printed in Oregon on December 7 ,  1 8 6 1 . 9 1  The announce­
ment was entitled " Important Circular , "  which was i s s ued 
by Secretary o f  State Seward . The c ircular warned against 
sece ssionist agents in various s tates who worked to gain 
recognition for their s tate from foreign countries . 
The circular pointed out that an obvious precaution 
to guard against a foreign invasion of coastal states was 
to put a l l  ports and harbors in a "condition of complete 
defense . '' But, the president could only grant as much money 
to the project as Congress al lowed him . Al though " the 
president fput]  forth the most di ligent e f forts to execute 
these measure s , "  the states were asked to partially fund 
the forts until the federal government could reimburse them . 
Oregon i ans , however , were unhappy with the way the govern­
ment a ttempted to reimburse them for the Indian wars of the 
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mid- 1 8 5 0 s ,  and they did not favor plac ing another economic 
burden upon themse lve s . 9 2  Therefore , the construction o f  
coastal defenses in Oregon along the Columbia River moved 
slowly . By September ,  1 8 6 2 ,  Oregon ' s  relat ionship with the 
federal government changed dramatica l l y .  
O n  September 1 0 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  Addison Crand a l l  Gibbs replaced 
John Whiteaker as Oregon ' s  Governor .  Gibb s ,  a Douglas 
Democ rat , firmly supported President Abraham Linco l1� and h i s  
vigorous prosecution of the war . I n  h i s  inaugural address 
he stated that the only reason Oregon was not a " r eenactment 
of the scenes of Kentucky and Tennes see , "  was because of the 
attention of Union men and the " vigilance" of the Lincoln 
administration . 9 3  Just as Sumner ' s  arrival revitalized 
the Pacific Coast , Whiteaker ' s  defeat in favor o f  Gibb s 
stimulated Oregonians to renewed vigor . The Oregon 
"Repub lican Revolution " was complete . 
Gibbs ' election did not instantly exterminate a l l  
secessionist sentiment ,  however . John Whiteaker ' s  relaxed 
atti tude toward secession i s t  activities during his four 
year term allowed the movement to take firm hold . Seces­
sionist activities did not end with Whiteaker ' s  term , and 
they were encouraged by every federal m i l itary setback 
in the Ea s t . 9 4  Gibbs ' initial goal was to e f fectively 
reorient state government and stop secess ionist activities 
in Oregon. Gibbs quickly and energetically launched h i s  
plan s .  
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Gibbs authorized the suppression o f  s ix ''offensively 
treasonabl e "  newspapers shortly after h i s  e lection . 9 5  
One such newspaper was the Portland Adver t i ser . The 
Advertiser ' s  s e l f-admitted duty was to " i nvoke the Divine 
interposition to stay the hand of Lincoln , paralyze h i s  
e f forts and thus put a stop to the unnatu ra l ,  intestine 
war that he has inaugurated and carried on . " 9 6  But , most 
significant ly , Gibbs reorganized army recruiting procedures 
in Oregon , although enthusiasm for enlistment was s l ight. 
On October 1 6 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  the s tate legisl ature passed a militia 
law . It empowered the governor to c a l l  three brigades o f  
militia into state service immediately t o  suppress 
insurrections , rebell ions , or perform any other duty in 
order to insure peace on the Oregon frontier . However , 
the militia was spec i f ically designed to check the Knights 
of the Golden Circ l e . 9 7  
M i l i tary reorganization was overdue in Oregon , however 
Lincoln ' s  supporters did not want to embarrass him by 
pointing out the army ' s  deficiencies . Lincoln ' s  friends 
were reluctant to expose the army ' s  weaknesses even though 
they perceived its errant structure . This attitude was 
exempli fied in a letter from D r .  Henry to Simeon Francis 
on March 1 ,  1 8 6 1 : 
. I do not think that friends as we are o f  Mr . 
Lincoln in this crisis we ought not to embarrass him.  
The army , as a general fact is sound . . and if there 
are o f ficers who are doubtful they wi l l  be sure , here-
after to keep their mouths close [ d ) , or leave . 9 8  
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The volunteer cavalry reg imen t ' s  purpose remained 
constant throughout the war . The September 2 4 ,  1 8 6 1  order 
direct ing Colonel Cornelius to organi z e  the First Oregon 
Cavalry never deviated from its original intent . The order 
stated the regiment ' s  purpose was chiefly to guard the 
frontier against any insurrections including foreign and 
domes t i c  secessionist plots and I ndian upri sings . The 
frontier ' s  defense concerning Indians was a potentially 
explosive s i tuation . Oregon had s u f fered through three 
major Indian wars between 1 8 4 7  and 1 8 5 8 .  Adequate 
protection from the Indians was needed to attract settler s ,  
and the removal o f  Oregon troops to the East and C a l i fornia 
at the War ' s  outbreak caused an immediate problem for Oregon 
c i t i zens . Bu t ,  that was only h a l f  o f  their problem . 
Secessionists i n  Oregon encouraged Indian attacks . 
The situation was especially bleak around Fort Hoskins , 
near Eugene City . Thomas B .  Campbe l l ,  Fort Hoskins ' Post 
Adj utant relayed an a lmost unbelievable story in a letter 
dated November 2 5 ,  1 8 6 1 . Campbel l  was in formed by a c it i z en 
that about 2 5 0  to 3 0 0  stands of arms were distributed to 
traitors near the Fort , and that he needed to di stribute 
weapons to Union men , but he did not know who they wer e .  
Campbe l l  was also in formed by the c itizen that the Fort ' s  
former commander " dis tributed to the Indians guns ar.d 
revolvers and anununition and told them to fight for J e ff 
Davis and the Southern Confederacy . "  The same i n formar,t 
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further c laimed to have overheard secessionists plotting to 
take over the Fort by setting " fire [ t o ]  the buildings and 
shoot [ i ng ] the o f ficers as they came out . 11 9 9  
In spite o f  the threats to their state ' s  security , 
Oregonians did not flock to enlist in the First Oregon 
Cava l ry .  The regiment ' s  purpose did l ittle to stimulate 
enthusiasm to j oin . Most men preferred to fight rebels in 
the East than Indians in the West .  Add itiona l ly , General 
Alvord commented that Oregon recruitment was hindered by 
''the mining excitement and temptations on this coa s t , in the 
depreciation of legal-tender note s ,  and the absence of war 
stimulus . 1 1 1 0 0  The major d i f ference b€ �ween Oregon soldiers 
and Potomac veterans was their age ; the Oregon volunteer 
being about four years older on the average than the Potomac 
soldier .  However , except for the daily boredom that the 
Oregon cavalrymen experienced and the combat that eastern 
soldiers experience d ,  the garrison l i fe of Oregon and 
Potomac soldiers was strikingly s imilar . Royal A .  Bense l J , 
an Oregon voluntee r ,  related that the most common o f fenses 
at Fort Yamhi l l ,  Oregon , were : drunkennes s ,  absence from 
camp without leave , insubordination , d i s respect to superior 
offj cers , absence from roll-call without leav e ,  turbulence 
after taps , sitting while on guard duty , gamb l ing , and 
leaving the beat without relief . 1 0 1  Many o f ficers turned 
down commissions in the state m i l i t i a  for the reason that 
Oregon troops would not see eastern action . Volunteer 
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recruitment was briefly stimulated when Colonel Baker 
promised that the regiment would see eastern action , 
but that hope died with Colonel Baker . 
The Oregon cavalry did not see eastern action , but 
its devotion to the Union was abso lut e .  The troops that 
composed the regiment did not forget their promise o f  
eastern duty , however . The Oregon s o ldiers implored Lincoln 
to transfer them east , but the president declined . Lincoln 
remembered the secessionist element in Oregon and reali zed 
the necess ity of protecting Oregon ians , and emigrant s ,  from 
resentful Indians . In October, 1 8 6 4 , Lincoln authorized 
Governor Gibbs to form a regiment o f  infantry to aid the 
First Oregon Cavalry.  The f i r s t  troops for the infantry 
regiment were not o f f i c i a l ly mustered into service unti l  
June 2 4 ,  1 8 6 5 ,  more than two months after Lee ' s  surrender 
at Appomattox . 1 0 2  Therefore , The First Oregon Cavalry was 
the only volunteer regiment Oregon produced during the war 
and its services were needed at home . Lincoln stated i t s  
primary duty was to "guard the State from foes both savage 
and traitorous from without and from open treason 
within . 11 1 0 3  
Lincoln ' s  policy for coastal defense moved swiftly 
through Congre s s .  On February 1 3 ,  1 8 6 2 , the House 
authorized the construction of twenty iron-clads . 1 0 4  
One week later on February 2 0 ,  appropriations for Lincoln ' s  
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plan to fortify ports and harbors were pas sed . In regard 
to Oregon , the b i l l  spec i fied : 
For defense in Oregon and Washington Territory , 
at or near the mouth o f  the Columbia River , one­
hundred thousand dollar s ,  i f  in the j u dgement o f  
the President, the same b y ,  o r  any part thereo f ,  
sha l l  be advisable . 1 0 5  
The coastal forti fication legislation passed within 
two months cf Lincoln ' s  " Important C i rcular " policy 
statemen t ,  but actual construction lagged behind the b i ll ' s  
passag e .  Brigadier General Benj amin Alvord , who relieved 
Colonel ,Justus Ste inberger as Commander o f  the D i strict o f  
Oregon o n  July 7 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  deserved much o f  the credit for 
agitating for the fort ' s  construction . I n  a letter to 
United States Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas , Alvord 
stated , " I  respectfully recommend that the President order 
the commencement of such defenses [ a s  were specified i n  
the February 2 0 ,  1 8 6 2  appropriations b i l l  concerning 
Oregon] . 11 1 0 6 On July 1 1 ,  1 8 6 3 ,  the Sentinel reported that 
the construction of the " long talked o f "  fort would proceed 
at once , and an iron-clad would accompany the fort on the 
Columbia Rive r . 1 0 7  By November 6 ,  1 8 6 3 ,  Alvord could report 
to Thomas that the batteries being erected on the Columbia 
River were " near completion . 11 1 0 8  The fort was completed on 
the south bank o f  the Columbia River before the conclusion 
of the War . The nonagon shaped fort was surrounded by 
earthworks and a thirty- foot wide ditch . It was chris tened 
Fort Stevens , after General I .  J .  Steven s ,  who died i n  
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battle on September 1 ,  1 8 6 2 ;  and , i t  was one o f  the best 
armed fortifications on the Pacific Coas t . 1 0 9  Oregon was 
manned, forti fied , and entrenched in the Union . 
The First Oregon Cavalry served its purpose we l l .  
Although the cavalry ranks appeared meager , especially 
when one considers that this was the only volunteer regiment 
Oregon contributed, it was e f fective . The regiment success­
fully deterred both foreign and dome stic secessionist plot s ,  
policed the frontier against hos tile Indians , and escorted 
citizens across the frontier . I n  shor t ,  the regiment 
enforced peace in Oregon , which was its sole purpose . The 
remarkably tranquil atmosphere also i l lu strated the triumph 
of Lincol n ' s  war policy concerning Oregon . 
Oregon ' s  situation at the time o f  Lincoln ' s  e lection 
was dismal . Seces s ionists controlled the state government 
and the mil itary and southern sympathy was strong and overt . 
One of Oregon ' s  Senators was an avid secessionist who 
conspired to separate the Pacific Coast from the Union . 
But ,  patiently , methodically , and quietly Abraham Lincoln 
and his administration solved these problems and kept Oregon 
in the Union. 
By July 1 8 6 3  Oregon was out of danger from seces� ion-
ists . The internal secessionists were under control , 
Linco ln ' s  bold order forming the First Oregon Cavalry 
insured peace, his forti fication o f  the Columbia River 
d i scouraged foreign int rigue , and Indian hos t i l i ties were 
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checked . The inhabitants o f  Oregon recognized this 
tremendous metamorphosis and subsequently Union Leagues , 
succeeded by Lincoln and Johnson clubs were formed to show 
support for the Lincoln admini stration . However , Lincoln ' s  
War policy was j us t  one aspect o f  h i s  policy concerning 
Oregon . 
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I V .  L I NCOLN ' S  DOMESTIC POLICY TOWARD OREGON 
Oregon was perhaps the state least e f fected by the 
Civil war with regard to combat , and according to Oregon ' s  
State Adj utant General Cyrus A .  Reed , Oregon was " far 
removed from the thunder and shock o f  battle . •• 1 1 0  No 
battles were fought within the stat e ,  and no Confederate 
campaign came close to its borders . As late as March 2 2 ,  
1 8 6 2 ,  Oregon ' s  contribution to the Union army was reported 
as only 1 , 0 0 0  troops , and the soldiers to c ivi lian ratio was 
l : S o . 1 1 1  As previously mentioned , some Oregon residents 
thought the state ' s  remotene ss from the conflict should 
exempt it from taking part in the War .  Although Pres ident 
Lincoln did not agree with this reasoning , it is significant 
that he exempted Oregon from fulfilling a volunteer quota 
obligation in his Proclamation o f  October 1 7 ,  1 8 6 3 . 1 1 2  
Lincoln possibly as sumed that a quota would drain many loyal 
citizens from Oregon and invite a sece s s i on i s t  or Indian 
uprising . O r ,  Lincoln may have reasoned that Oregon ' s  scant 
population could not ful fill a quota and remain a viable 
loyal state for an extended period o f  time . Whatever reason 
Lincoln had for exempting Oregon , one important factor for 
doing so was to concentrate on using its material resources 
for the Union e f fort . 
Lincoln understood that a war could not be fought with 
only soldier s .  An e f fective fighting machine had to he 
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properly financed , and the Civ il War was extremely cos t l y .  
But Oregon ' s  population was sma l l . O n  September 2 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  
the Statesman reported Oregon ' s  quota for the national 
revenue b i l l  was only $ 3 5 , 1 4 0 . 1 1 3  Lincoln recognized that 
Oregon ' s  wealth lay in its gold mines rather than its troop 
and tax potentia l ,  and the President exploited these assets 
for the Union bene fit . Oregon ' s  gold donation to the Union 
is often overlooked due to the emphas i s  on C a l i fornia gold 
during the mid 1 8 0 0 s . Oregon , the Washington Territory and 
Montana produced three- fourths of C a l i fornia ' s  gold 
production in their combined peak gold production years 
o f  1 8 6 1  through 1 8 6 7 . 1 1 4  
Gold was i n i t ia l ly di scovered i n  Oregon in 1 8 4 5 ,  
and various small discoveries were made until the major 
discoveries were made in the Thompson and Fraser rivers 
in 1 8 5 6  and 1 8 5 7 .  By 1 8 5 8  the Oregon gold rush was on and 
Portland emerged as Oregon ' s  major metropolitan center .  
Portland ' s  population doubled to 2 9 1 7  inhabitants between 
1 8 5 7  and 1 8 6 0 .  In 1 8 6 3  Thomas Frazar , a Lincoln appointee 
for col lector of Revenue at Port land , reported that total 
gold assay s  in Portland was $ 4 , 5 05 , 7 3 1 .  For one three 
month ' s  period in 1 8 6 4  Frazar reported Portland ' s  gold 
assays to be $ 1 , 3 7 6 , 6 7 8 . 8 2 .  The total shipments o f  gold 
bullion from Portland by We lls Fargo exvress in 1 8 6 4  was 
$ 6 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ;  and in 1 8 6 5  it was $ 5 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 1 1 5 . Over 4 0  per 
cent of the United States total gold product between 1 8 6 1  
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and 1 8 6 7  came from Oregon and the Pac i f i c  Coa s t . 1 1 6  These 
figures i l lustrate Oregon ' s  importance for financing the 
expansion of the national economy and the Union war e f fort . 
Oregon ' s  economic importance a l so revea l s  the partial 
motivation behind Lincoln ' s  intense desire to retain Oregon 
in the Unio n .  I f  Oregon and the other Paci fic Coast states 
aided the Confederac y ,  as Jefferson Davi s  was promi sed , the 
course of the Civil War would have undoubtedly been a l tered . 
I n  fac t ,  the Confederate Congress passed a series o f  
resolutions on October 2 ,  1 8 6 2  that recognized the practical 
neutrality o f  Oregon and the rest o f  the Pacific Coast 
states and territories . 1 1 7  The Confederacy faced the 
problem o f  inadequate funding at the War ' s  outset . 
Converse ly , the Union e n j oyed a greater economic advantage 
over the Confederacy that was partially due to Pacific Coast 
gold even though the national debt had mounted because o f  
the War .  Bad Oregon been persuaded to init iate a Paci f i c  
Coast Republic and fund the Confederate w a r  e f for t ,  the 
complexion of the War would have been d i f ferent . Although 
Oregon and the Pacific Coast would not have been enough to 
tip the advantage toward the Confederates , a Pac i f i c  Coast 
Republic could have forced the war to drag on longer by 
providing adequate arms and ammunit ion to the rebe l s . I t  
would have a l so created a n  enlarged area for the Union 
troops to subdue . Oregon was a l so an important source o f  
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woolens for uni forms during the War ,  a commodity greatly 
demanded by the Southerners . 1 1 8  
Oregon ' s  gold supply and the Civil War stimulated 
federal support for those internal improvements that the 
state had voiced concern for since i t s  territorial 
inceptio n .  Oregonians , inhabitants o f  the most remote area 
within the United States , perennia l ly demanded a Paci fic 
rai lroad . This reque s t , along with many others from Oregon 
was typical of the western frontier . The Democrats hounded 
for internal improvements in Oregon, but the Republicans 
succe s s fully turned the i s sue in their favor as part o f  
the "Oregon Revolution" in 1 8 6 0 .  Repub l icans held a !;tate 
convention in Salem on April 2 1 ,  1 8 5 9 ,  and a Paci f i c  r a i l ­
road w a s  a t  the top o f  their demands . 1 1 9 Oregonians 
realized that eastward transportation wou l d  accelerate 
wealth production, and Lincoln realized accelerated western 
wealth production was a must for thee War e f fort . However , 
by early 1 8 6 2  fourteen miles o f  portage r a i l roads a long the 
Columbia River was the extent of Oregon ' s  steel rai l s .  Also 
in early 1 8 6 2 ,  the Union armies were being beaten and the 
federal treasury was being drained . Oregon was s t i l l  
governed by John Whiteaker until September , 1 8 6 2 ,  and that 
state had heretofore been more of a problem than an asset . 
The Lincoln admi nistration kept Oregon i n  the Union , and i t  
was t ime for Oregon to repay its d ebt . 
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The federal treasury wns in the red ; but , gold was in 
the Oregon mountains and river s .  With t h i s  i n  mind , the 
federal government hastily began the internal improvemen t s  
i n  transportation and communication that Oregonians long 
demanded .  On December 1 0 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  a message from President 
Lincoln was printed in Oregon . Lincoln ' s  statement bega n :  
I submit a statement o f  the proceedings o f  the 
[ P a c i f i c  Railroad] Commi s s ion , which shows the 
progress that has been made in the enterprise o f  
constructing the Pacific Railroad , and this suggests 
the earliest completion of the road , and a lso the 
favorable action of Congress on the pro j ec t  now 
pending before them . . .  1 2 0  
I n  fact , the Pac i fic Railroad would have been built much 
earlier had the plan not been sabotaged. The Paci f i c  Coa s t  
Republic conspirator s ,  including Lane , concentrated their 
e f forts on halting the transcontinental r a i lroad whi l e  
informing their constituents that other federal government 
officials hampered the plan . 1 2 1  
I n  Ju ly 1 8 6 2  Lincoln signed a b i l l  to aid i n  the 
construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the 
Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean . 1 2 2  Al though this act 
was passed as a war measure , construction was slowed by the 
war .  Oregon ' s  citizens and the state legislature aided the 
federal government with money , land , and even a surveyor ' s  
report by 1 8 6 4 .  Howeve r ,  specific plans for cons truction 
did not begin until 1 8 6 6 .  Throughout the Civil War , gold 
from Oregon relied on the Wells Fargo express for its 
j ourney eastward . Lincoln initiated the rail road era in 
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O r egon w i th regard to t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  b u t  i t  was n o t  
u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  W a r  t h a t  t h e  T r an s c o n t i n e n t a l  R a i l r o ad w i t h  
b r a n c he s  t o  O regon w a s  comp l e ted . L in c o l n  had a m o r e  p r o -
f o u n d  e f f e c t  u p o n  O r egon in o t h e r  a s p e c t s . 
T h e  f ed e r a l  c o u r t  s y s t e m  in O r egon w a s  r e organ i z e d  at 
L i n c o l n ' s  r e q u e s t .  I n  h i s  a n n u a l  m e s s age to C o n g r e s s  on 
D e c em b e r  3 ,  1 86 1 ,  L i n c o l n  p o i n ted o u t  s o m e  s y s t e m i c  
w e a k n e s s e s  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  j u d i c i a l  s y s t e rn . 1 2 3  L i n c o l n  
s t a ted t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e t a i n  u n i f o r m i t y  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  
j u d i c i a l  s y s t e m ,  a v a s t r eorgan i z a t i o n  w a s  n e eded . I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  n o t  a l l  s t a t e s  c o n f o rmed t o  t h e  s a m e  f ed e r a l  
c i r c u i t  c o u r t  s y s t e m . T h e  c o u n t r y  w a s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  
c i r c u i t s ,  and a U n i ted S ta t e s  S u p r em e  C o u r t  J u s t i c e  w a s  
p ic ked f r o m  e a c h  c i r cu i t .  T h e  j u s t i c e s  s a t  on t h e  U n i t ed 
S t a t e s  S u p r eme C o u r t  w h e n  i t  w a s  in s e s s i o n , and a f t e r  
a d j o u r n m e n t  t h e y  r e tu rn ed home and p r e s id e d  o v e r  t h e i r  
fed e r a l  c i r c u i t s .  H o w ev e r , t h i s  s y s t e m  w a s  n o t  app l ied 
t o  e a c h  s t a t e  a t  the t ime o f  L i n c o l n ' s  e l e c t i o n . 
T h e  f ed e r a l  c i r c u i t  c o u r t  s y s t e m  f a i l ed t o  expand to 
a c commod a t e  n e w  s t a t e s  that e n t e r e d  the Un i o n . W i s c on s in , 
H in n e so t a ,  I o w a ,  Kan s a s ,  F l o r i d a ,  T e x a s , C a l i f o r n i a ,  and 
O r egon " n ev e r  had any" c i r c u i t  c o u r t s  a t tended b y  Sup r e m e  
C o u r t  J u s t i c es b e f o r e  L i n c o l n ' s  t e r m .  L i n c o ln p r e s e n t e d  
t hr e e  p r op os a l s  to r e c t i fy t h e  s i tu a t i o n  a n d  t h e y  w e r e  m e a n t  
t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  c o u r t  s y s t e m  w i t ho u t  c r e a t ing " a  c o u r t  
a l toge t h e r  t o o  n u m e r o u s  f o r  a j u d i c i a l  body o f  a n y  s o r t  to 
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f u n c t ion . "  L i n c o l n ' s  p r o p o s a l s  w e r e : expand ing t h e  s y s t e m  
t h e n  u s e d  by i n c o rp o r a t ing t he s t a t e s  t h a t  d id n o t  have 
c i rc u i t s ,  r e l i e v in g  S u p r eme C o u r t  J u s t i c e s  f ro m  c i r c u i t  
d u t y ,  o r  ab o l i sh in g  c i r c u i t  c o u r t s  i n  f a v o r  o f  expand ing 
the p o w e r  of the d is t r i c t  c ou r t s . L i n c o l n  added t h a t  e a c h  
s t a t e  had t o  b e  r e p r es e n ted i n  t h e  s y s t e m  o r  i t  s ho u l d  be 
ab o l i s hed ; and , that t h e  adopt i on o f  any o f  his p r o p o s a l s  
" wo u ld b e  a n  i m p r o v e m e n t  upon o u r  p r es e n t  s y s t e m . " 1 24 
C o n g r e s s  moved s lugg i s h l y  to e n a c t  l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n c e rn ing 
O r egon ' s  f e d e r a l  j ud ic ia l  s y s t e m . 
Cong r e s s  in i t i a l l y  a p p e a r ed to p u r p o s e l y  i g n o r e  t h e  
f e d e r a l  c o u r t  p r o b l e m  in O r egon . On J u l y  1 5 ,  1 8 6 2 , C o n g r e s s  
c r e a t ed n i n e  c i r c u i t s  a n d  e x p a n d e d  t h e  c i r c u i t  c ou r ts · 
p o w e r s  a t  t he expense o f  t h e  d is t r i c t  cou r t s . 1 2° C o n g r e s s  
a l s o  i n c o r p o r a t e d  e ac h  s t a t e  t ha t  L in c o l n  s p e c if ied , e x c e p t  
C a l i f o r n i a  and Oregon . I t  was n o t  u n t i l  H a r c h  3 ,  1 8 6 3  t h a t  
C o n g r e ss i n c o r p o r a ted C a l i f o r n i a  a n d  O r egon by c r e a t i n g  t h e  
T e n t h  C i rcu i t .  T h i s  A c t  a l s o  f ixed t he n u m b e r  o f  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  J u s t i c e s  a t  n i n e . 1 2 0 L i n c o l n  was a l l o w e d  to p i c k  a 
J u s t i c e ,  and he s p e n t  h i s  c h o i c e  on a P a c i f i c  C o a s t  c i t i z en . 
I r o n i c - a l l y ,  L i n c o l n  c h o s e  J u d g e  S te p hen J .  F i e l d . F i e l d 
was t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  C h i e f  J u s t i c e , and o n e  o f  
t h e  l o y a l  men w h o  s e c r e t l y  mon i t o red t h e  Pac i f i c  C o a s t  
s e c e s s i o n i s t  s i tu a t i o n  f o r  L i n c o l n  p r i o r  to A l b e r t  S id n e y  
J o h n s t on ' s  remova l .  
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H o m e s t e ad l e g i s l a t i o n  w a s  a n o t h e r  p e r en n i a l  demand t h a t  
O r egon i an s  mad e on t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m en t .  L i n c o ln t o u c h e d  
a r e s p o n s i v e  c ho rd i n  O r egon in a n  add r e s s  o f  D e c e m b e r  2 1 ,  
1 86 1 .  He s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  t h e  coun t r y ' s  
b u s i n e s s  caused b y  t h e  C i v i l  W a r  " ob s t r u c ted s e t t l e m e n t s  
in t h e  n e w  S t a t e s  a n d  T e r r i to r i e s  o f  t h e  N o r t h we s t . " 1 2 7 
L i n c o l n  r e p o r t e d  t h i s  o b s t r u c t i o n  c o s t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  $ 1  
m i l l i on i n  r e c e i p t s t o  t h e  P a t e n t  O f f  i c e  w h i c h  f o r ced a 
l arge r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h a t  o f f i ce ' s  p e r s on n e l  t o  k e e p  i t  s e l f -
s u s t a i n i n g . L i n c o ln ' s  a c kn o w l�dgment o f  t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  o n e  
t h a t  Oregon i a n s  w e r e  w e l l  a w a r e  o f ,  w a s  m u s i c  t o  t h e i r  e a r s . 
O r egon i an s ' d e m a n d s  f o r  a home s te ad b i l l  w e r e  s econd 
o n l y  to t h e i r  demands f o r  a P ac i f i c  r a i l road . T hey r e a l i z e d  
t h a t  t h e  O r eg o n  T r a i l  w a s  a l o n g ,  d an g e r o u s  t r e k  t h a t  d id 
n o t  p r o v i d e  t h e  l u r e  t ha t  b e t t e r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and '' f r e e  
l an d "  wou ld . A l a w  w a s  p a s s e d  t h a t  d o n a t ed f r e e  l a n d  to 
Or egon e m i g r a n t s  in 1 8 5 0 ,  b u t  i t  w a s  n o t  a p e r m a n e n t  
home s t e ad law . T he C i v i l  W a r  p r ov id e d  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  
f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  e n a c t  a n a t i o n a l  home s t e ad l a w . 
T h e  H o m e s t e ad A c t  p a ss e d  by C o n g r e s s  on H a y  2 0 ,  1 8 6 2  
w a s  d e s i gn e d  t o  b o o s t  agr i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t i on . O r egon had 
an abundance of l and , b u t  t h e  l aw d id n o t  p r o d u c e  t h e  exodus 
for w h i c h  i t  w a s  in t e n d e d . T h e  H o m e s t e a d  L aw p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
a s e t t l e r  cou ld o b t a i n  1 6 0  a c r e s  o f  u n a p p r o p r i a t e d  l a n d  f o r  
a $ 1 0  f e e . T h e  s e t t l e r  o b t a in ed t h e  l a n d  t i t le i f  h e  l ived 
o r  c u l t i v a t ed the l and for f i v e  y e ar s .  T h e  H o m e s t e ad Law 
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was not su i ta b l e  for i ts purpose i n  the Northwes t ,  however . 
The 160 acre t r acts were inapprop r i at e  for e f f icient Nor t h ­
west f a r ming. The l a w  was most e f f ec t ive f o r  m i d western 
farming and the l aw ' s  intent was defeated when i t  was 
app l ied to Western forested areas. 1 2 0  The act was received 
w i th measured enthusiasm in O r egon . 
Some O r egoni ans v iewed the federal Homestead Law as an 
overdue attempt t o  encourage set t lemen t . In response t o  the 
Homestead Law, the Sentinel grumb led , " Had i t  not been for 
the war [ s i c ] , the Pac i f i c  coast wou ld have recei ved a 
larger accession t o  i ts pop u l a t i on than at any p r e v i ous 
year . " 1 2 0 Due to the defic iencies of the Law ' s  app l ication 
to the Northwest, this assum p t ion is questionable, b u t  i t  
was a pop u l ar sentiment . O n  A p r i l  3 0 ,  1 8 6 2 , before the land 
embraced in the Homestead Act was su r veyed , Gene r a l  Wr ight 
p r oc l a i med that a l l  surveyors and preemptors were req u i red 
t o  take an oath of a l l eg i ance t o  the Union . 1 3 0  
O n  Hay 2 8 , 1 8 6 2 ,  the spec i f ics for Oregon land sales 
under the Homestead Act were announced . J .  H .  Edmu n d s ,  
Commiss ioner o f  the General Land O f f ice , announced t h at b y  
a recent proc lamat i on , "  b y  President L inco l n ,  a l l  land west 
of the Cascade Mountains to the Pac i f ic Ocean , except 
donation c l a i ms, p re-empt ions comp leted , and m ineral lands, 
would be offered for sale on October 6 ,  1862. 13 1 On January 
2 1 ,  1 8 6 3  t he S u r veyor General of Oregon reported that 
6 , 2 1 9 . 6 8 2  acres were sur veyed , of which 4 , 442. 7 0 0  acres 
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would b e  sold . Oregonians were generally pleased with the 
completed homestead legis lation , but other federal 
legi slat ion was not so popular. 
Oregon ' s  Indian War debt controversy raged from the mid 
1 85 0 s  through Lincol n ' s  administration . The "Oregon and 
Washington Territory War Debt" controversy was a drawn out , 
confusing i s sue concerning federal reimbursement to c i tizens 
for loans to the government in order to fight Indian wars . 
The Oregon debt was contracted between 1 8 5 5  and 1 8 5 6 .  
Oregon bus i nessmen initially thought that government 
purchases would stimulate the economy , so they eagerly and 
liberally sold supplies to the federal commi ssary on cred i t .  
The idea was that the government wou l d  repay the debt fully 
and promptly after the wars , but thi s was not the case . 1 3 2  
Congress appointed a commiss ion to arrive at a just 
compensation award for the Oregon debt after the wars were 
complete d . The commission,  which c on s i s ted o f  one Oregon 
citizen , Lafayette F .  Grove r ,  and two United States Army 
Captains , Rufus Inga l l s  and Andrew J .  Smith , calculated the 
federal debt owed Oregon to be $ 6 , 0 1 1 , 4 5 7 . 3 6 . 1 3 3  However , 
on March 2 ,  1 8 6 1 ,  Third Auditor Robert J .  Atkinson i s sued a 
report that reduced Oregon ' s  award . Congress responded to 
Atkinson ' s  report by appropriating $ 2 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  for repayment 
of Oregon ' s  war debt in twenty-year United States bonds at 
an annual rate of s ix per cent . Oregonians felt they were 
cheated by Congres s '  appropriation and they sent a petition 
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to President Lincoln on November 1 ,  1 8 6 1 for redres s  o f  
their grievanc e s .  The petition was s igned by 7 0 1  Oregon 
and Washington Territory citizens , including future Oregon 
Governor Addison Cranda l l  Gibbs . 1 3 4  
Pres ident Lincoln received the respectfully worded 
petition on May 1 ,  1 8 6 2 .  The Pres ident obviously had no 
legal power concerning an appropr iation grievanc e ,  so he 
forwarded the petition , along with a copy o f  the Third 
Audi tor ' s  report to the Senate . The petition stated that 
Oregonians were wronged for three main reasons . The three 
central grievances were that the reward was too sma l l ,  that 
more than six years e lapsed since the debt was incurred , and 
that the interest was not granted from the correct date . 
Atkinson i s sued a statement to Congress defending h i s  
original report against t h e  petition . He claimed that 
the repayment was handled as speedily as possible ,  and he 
offered proof that if his figure was wrong , it actually 
"discriminated in their [Oregonian s ]  favor . "  Congress was 
swayed by Atkinson ' s  rebu t ta l ,  and Oregonians were repaid in 
1 8 6 1  in accordance with Atkinson ' s  original recommendation . 
However ,  the debt was not p�id in gold , but in depreciated 
greenbacks . 1 3 5  Though d i sappointe d ,  Oregonians ' faith in 
the Union was not shook , howeve r .  
Oregonians made many dome stic gains despite their 
setback in the war debt settlement . The Home stead Act 
encouraged some migration into Orego11 , and gold also 
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encouraged settlement while it pumped v i t a l i ty into the 
economy . Gold also accelerated the long awaited Pac i f i c  
Railroad construction , and precipitated communication 
advancements . The transcontinental telegraph connections 
with Portland crept northward from Sacramento and Yrek a ,  
C a l i forn i a ,  between 1 8 5 8  and 1 8 6 1 .  Portland was finally 
connected to the telegraph on March 5 ,  1 8 6 4 .  The f i r s t  
telegraph message sent e a s t  from Portland w a s  from Governor 
Gibbs to President Lincoln on March 8 ,  1 8 6 4 .  Gibbs ' message 
exemp l i f ied Oregon ' s  Union sympathie s : 
Our telegraph completed.  Let the great Pacific 
Railroad with a branch to Oregon soon fol l ow . 
We want no Pacific republic , no compromise with 
rebe l s  i n  arms , and no more slavery . 1 3 6  
Lincol n ' s  domestic policy toward their state kept 
Oregonians contented , but Gibbs ' te legram also a l luded that 
Oregon, l ike other states , s t i l l  depended upon the federal 
government for protection . Gibbs ' mention of the Pac ific 
Rai l road indicated that more internal improvements were 
neede d .  The telegram a lso intimated that Oregon ' s  security 
was s t i l l  dependent upon the federal m i l itary . By 1 8 6 3  
Lincoln ' s  War policy generally secured Oregon f rom internal 
threats , but complacency could not be a f forded . Obviously 
the Paci f i c  Coast Republ i c  and ''rebels in arms" remained 
issues in Oregon after Gibbs ' election and h i s  telegram 
i l lustrated that Oregon s t i l l  needed Lincoln ' s  attention . 
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V .  LINCOLN ' S  LATER WAR POLICY TOWARD OREGON 
The Pacific Coast Repub lic scheme l i ngered i n  some 
Oregonian s '  minds throughout the War ,  and at times the 
fear of the plot ' s  success almost caused an atmosphere o f  
paran o i a .  The idea o f  a Pacific Coast ReFublic was a lso 
invoked to inspire loyalty and patriotism for the Union , 
especially when the federals lost eastern batt le s .  Anson 
Henry told Lincoln that the Statesman was the "most zealous 
and e f f ic ient supporter of you here in Oregon , "  and th i s  
paper was especially good a t  exploiting the Pac i f i c  Coast 
Repub l i c  scheme to the Union ' s  advantage . 1 3 7  An eloquent 
editorial upholding the principles of the United S tates 
Const itution was printed under the head l ine , " Lane Aga inst 
Madison ; "  and a fter Senator Latham of Cali fornia switched 
his loyalty from the Pacific Coast Republ i c  to the Union , 
the headline read , "Latham Brought to H i s  Senses . 11 1 3 8  This 
attitude was also carried out in the government secto r .  
O n  September 9 and 1 0 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  the Oregon state 
legi slature discussed a series of resolutions o f fered by 
John R. McBr ide . The resolutions were strongly pro-Union , 
pro-Lincoln, and anti-secess ionis t .  The legislature pledged 
its support for Linco l n ,  and stated that any attempt to 
embarrass the President " should be regarded as unpatriotic 
and having a direct tendency to aid the traitors now 
fighting against the government . "  The legislature also 
7 0  
resolved that the Pacific Coast Repub l i c  met " the emphatic 
condemnation of the people o f  Oregon , and we denounce it a s  
a development o f  treason favored by no man who has intelli­
gence and patriotism. 11 1 3 9  The legislature was given a 
chance to prove i t s  loyalty soon after the resolutions 
were pas sed . 
By 1 8 6 3  there was an open complaint from official 
quarters that Oregon had not rai sed i t s  share o f  troop s . 1 4 0  
Lincoln desired to expand the First Oregon Cavalry t o  full 
strength . Colonel Thomas Cornelius initially tried to 
recruit eight companies for the F i. r s t  Oregon Cavalry ; but , 
on February 2 4 ,  1 8 6 2 ,  the Commander o f  the Department only 
al lowed for s ix companies to complete the reg iment . 1 4 1  
Cornelius resigned over this dispute i n  1 8 6 2  but by 1 8 6 3  
the regiment was expande d .  
On January 5 ,  1 8 6 3 ,  Benj amin Alvor d ,  Commander o f  
the Oregon District wrote Governor Gibbs concerning the 
expansion o f  the First Oregon Cavalry . General Alvord 
carried out Lincoln ' s  desire and " requested" that s i x  
additional companies be raised to " complete the F i r s t  
Regiment of Cavalry Oregon Volunteer s . 11 1 4 2  The Governor 
responded immediate ly . In a proclamation printed on January 
1 0 ,  1 8 6 3 ,  Gibbs in formed the Oregonians that the " Pres ident 
of the United Sta tes " requested that s ix volunteer companies 
be recruited; and , he hoped that " the call w i l l  promptly be 
responded to by the local c itj zens o f  this State . 11 1 4 3  The 
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additional troops were needed for the same ass ignment for 
which the original regiment was formed . Not surpris ing l y ,  
enthusiasm in Oregon was s light and recruitment lagged . 
The standard complaint that western service with 
no hope of eastern action was j u s t  one o f  a multitude o f  
grievan ce s .  The Oregon troops were also paid i n  depreciated 
legal tender notes instead of spec ie . General Wright 
recognized this problem, and rea lized that fulfilling 
Lincoln ' s  request for additional troops from Oregon would 
be nearly impos s ible i f  they were to be paid in greenbacks . 
Wright o f f icially requested from the War Department that 
Pacific Coast troops be paid in specie . Wright claimed that 
the depreciated greenbacks were worth less in the West than 
they were in the Eas t . 1 4 4  However , the federal government 
responded that the greenbacks were j u s t  as worthless in the 
East as they were in the We s t ,  and Wright ' s  request was 
denied . The military organization o f  the First Oregon 
Cavalry a l so d i scouraged recruitment . 
On July 7 ,  1 8 6 2  Brigadier General Benj amin Alvord 
assumed command of the District of Oregon replacing Colonel 
Justus Steinberge r ,  who was immed iately sent to Fort Wa l la 
Wa l l a .  Steinberger ' s  predecessor was Reuben F .  Maury, a 
popular resident of Oregon . Steinberger , on the other hand , 
was a c i t i zen o f  the Washington Territory and a former 
infantry commander . To make matters wors e ,  Steinberger had 
been an Oregon proxy delegate to the Bal timore convention 
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that nominated Breckinridge and Lane . No doubt some 
Oregonians were not excited about serving in a cavalry 
regiment under a " foreign" infantry ccrnmander that helped 
nominate a sece ss ionist to run against Lincoln in 1 8 6 0 . 1 4 5  
Steinberger remained in command o f  the regiment until Maury 
received his promotion to Colonel and ordered to relieve 
General Alvord as Commander of the District of Oregon on 
March 2 3 ,  1 8 6 s . 1 4 6  The First Oregon Cavalr y ,  therefore , 
was under an unpopular commander for most o f  the War . 
I t  i s  not surprising that Lincoln ' s  request to expand 
Oregon ' s  mounted regiment was not quickly fulfi lled . 
Another factor that worked against recruitment was that the 
request for this expansion came in January , 1 8 6 3 ,  when Union 
battle losses in the East had a detrimental e f fect on 
soldier moral e .  By Marc h ,  1 8 6 3 ,  the Argus reported that 
only one company, of the proposed s i x ,  was " nearly fu l l . " 
General Alvord expressed his impatience with the recrui tment 
pace in a letter in which he state d ,  "Oregon had not raised 
her share of troop s .  C a l i fornia has sent nearly nine 
regimen t s ,  and Oregon but seven companies into the 
field . 11 1 4 7  
I n  this tens e ,  apathetic atmosphere , General Wright 
issued an impassioned plea to the Oregonians for recruits . 
In his proclamation o f  April 7 ,  1 8 6 3 ,  Wright pointed out 
that Oregonians were relatively untouched by the War that 
"drenched in blood the fairest portion of our beloved 
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country . "  Wright also warned that unless the Pacific 
Coast frontiers were kept well guarded , the bless ing 
o f  peace among them was in j eopardy . Wright beseeched : 
Are you prepare d ,  then to sacri f i ce a l l  these 
b l e s s ings to prove recreant to yourselves , to the 
nation and to the high and holy trust transmitted 
to you by the founders of our repub lic?  No . 
Already I hear the welkin ring with shouts o f  
a c c l amation : ' The Union shall b e  preserved . '  
Although the great ma ss of the people on the 
Pacific Coast are eminently patriotic and devoted 
to the Union . . we have traitors in our midst 
who are doing a l l  in their power to involve this 
country in the horrors of civil war . 1 4 8  
The only ringing shouts Wright heard were entirely 
within his head . Only one company o f  recruits was mustered 
into the service in f u l f i l lment of Lincoln ' s  request for s i x  
companie s .  Company G ,  First Oregon Cava lry , was Oregon ' s  
final contribution to its mounted regimen t . 1 4 9  Wright 
brought up the need to defend the P a c i f i c  Coast from 
traitors i n  his proclamation. Once again , an intimation 
concerning the Pacific Coast Republic was used to arouse 
patriotism.  Although it did not succeed in enlisting many 
recruits , Wright ' s  concerns were well founded because the 
Knights o f  the Golden Circle had gained additional members 
and momentum with every Union setback in the East . 
A proposed draft supplied important impetus to the 
Knight s '  movement .  The state legisl ature openly intimated 
the draft could be employed to supply men when recruitment 
proceeded s lowly for the First Oregon Cavalry . The Oregon 
Knights , however ,  would not tolerate a draft without a 
7 4  
fight , and the state legislature did not antagonize this 
highly vo latile group . The authority for a state draft was 
bequeathed to the legislature in the 1 8 6 2  militia b i l l ,  but 
it was net used in Oregon during the War . 
The Oregon legislature opted against conscription . 
The legis lature ' s  reasoning behind pursuing a non-coercive 
recruitment policy was pragmatic rather than philosophic . 
The Oregon legislature received re liable information whi c h  
predicted t h a t  instituting a draft would b e  counterpro­
ductive to its goal of insuring peace within Oregon . 
Leg i s lators were aware o f  the Knight s '  existence and i t s  
probable opposition t o  the draf t ;  but ,  before 1 8 6 3  i t  wa s 
not known how formidable the oppos ition would be . Increased 
intel ligence concerning the Oregon Knights was available 
after Gibbs ' election to the governorship due to the 
infiltration of the organization by loyal Union spie s .  
Union spies kept e f ficient tabs on the Oregon 
Knigh t s . 1 5 0  Julius M. Keeler was appointed provost Marshal 
of the D i strict of Oregon on May 2 2 ,  1 8 6 3  with the respons­
ibility o f  foiling the Knight s '  activities . Captain Keeler 
arrived in Oregon in 1 8 6 3  with a corps o f  detectives who had 
orders to monitor the Knights and to arrest any members who 
actively planned any armed rebellion against the federal 
government . The spies , who answered to Oregon ' s  state 
Adjutant General Reed supplied intell igence concerning 
the secretive group . Before Oregon ' s spy network was 
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implemented, loyal state authori t i e s  could only con j ecture 
about the Knight s '  plan s ,  strength , and goa l s . The spies 
confirmed that the Knights boasted approximately 2 , 5 0 0  
members by 1 8 6 4 ,  and that at least ten separate c ircles 
exi sted i n  Oregon . The c ircles were mostly i n  southern 
Oregon, and there were two circles each in Portland and 
Salem. 1 5 1  The spies also d i scovered that the Knights were 
not only organized,  but active . 
The Oregon Knights planned armed rebe l l ion against the 
federal government .  John o .  Shelton . a Union spy, learned 
that the Knights planned a rebel lion in order to form the 
Pac i fic Coast Republ i c ,  and they were waiting for an 
opportune moment to set thei r  plan i n  mot ion . Indee d ,  
crates o f  arms and ammun i t i on were secretly stored for this 
purpose . The spies a l so spoiled " s everal" attempts by the 
Knights to assass inate Adj utant General Reed and capture the 
federal arsena l . 1 5 2  Reed ' s  spies also furnished him with 
a list o f  prominent Knight s '  member s .  The list included 
Democratic newspaper edi tors and politic ians , including 
Gibbs ' opponent for the Oregon governorship in 1 8 6 2 ,  John 
F .  M i l l e r .  The Lincoln admi ni stration ' s  perspicacity in 
dealing with the Oregon K�ights was admirab l e .  A n  attempt 
to crush the movement without j u st provocation could have 
incited a rebellion by supplying the Knights with the 
opportunity it awaited . Conversely , ignoring the highly 
volatile group could have been detrimental to the Oregon 
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Union e f fort .  Lincoln ' s  policy , administered through 
Adjutant General Reed , e f fectively and covertly subverted 
the subver s ive s .  
The Oregon legisl ature doub t l e s s ly recognized the 
pos sibi l i ty of the Knights mob i l i z ing i f  draft legis lation 
were passed.  The legis lature reali zed that economic 
inducements for enlistment would be an e ffective alternative 
to coercive measure s .  The legis lature could not a f ford to 
delay . Union enthusiasm for recruitment was waning in 
Oregon j u s t  as more troops were needed due to the Knight ' s  
consolidation cf their power . A memorandum sent from 
Adjutant General Reed to Brigadier General Alvord on October 
2 8 ,  1 8 6 3  described the current atmosphere in Oregon: 
This day I received a communication from Capt . 
Julius M .  Keeler . . by which i t  seems there i s  
some danger o f  a resi stance t o  the laws and an 
organizati on of men for that purpose . . It 
appears to me that measures should be taken , i f  
pos sible , to prevent an outbrea k ,  for i f  civil 
s t r i fe should once commence on this coast there 
is no knowing where it would end . . It i s  
evident that prudenc e ,  energy, and firmness must 
be the governing principle of men in authority, 
in order to prevent a calamity that does in a 
measure hang over us . 1 5 3 
Further factors compounded Oregon ' s  military problems . 
The first four companies mustered into the First Oregon 
Cavalry were due to be di scharged in the f a l l  of 1 8 6 4 . 
Recruitment to replenish the cavalry ranks was hampered by 
Congressional bung l ing . When the First Oregon Cavalry was 
formed in 1 8 6 1 , the men were required to supply their own 
horses and equipment . On June 2 0 ,  1 8 6 4 ,  Congress passed a 
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law that i l lustrated its misunderstanding o f  Oregon cavalry 
service . After June , 1 8 6 4 ,  the men were still required to 
supply their own horses , but they no longer received 
compensation . This act demora li zed Union cavalry troops 
in Oregon. The nature o f  the First Oregon Cavalry ' s  duty 
required extensive excursions across the frontier which took 
a heavy toll on hors e s .  The federal government , however , 
was obliv ious at best and unfeeling at wors t ,  toward its 
plight . At thi s  j uncture the federal government seemingly 
added insult to the Oregonians ' injurie s .  
By October , 1 8 6 4 ,  the Lincoln administration had cal led 
on Oregon to supply an in fantry regiment . On July 1 , 1 8 6 4  
Major General Irwin McDowe l l  relieved Brigadier General 
George Wright as Commander of the Department of the Paci fic . 
Four months after McDowe l l  as sumed command , he received an 
order from the War Department reque s t ing that " a  regiment 
of infantry be raised in Oregon as soon as possib l e . 11 1 5 4  
McDowell forwarded the president ' s  " request" t o  Governor 
Gibb s .  Later on October , 2 0 ,  1 8 6 4 ,  Gibbs forwarded 
McDowe l l ' s  mes sage and appealed to the legislature t o  
emulate the example o f  other states and pass an economic 
incentive to attract volunteer s . 1 5 5  Gibbs reasoned that 
this method would attract volunteers without resorting 
to the draft and antagoniz ing the Knight s .  The Oregon 
legislature responded to Lincoln ' s  call for additiona l 
Oregon troops to replace the cavalry volunteers whose term 
7 8  
of enlistment were nearly expired and took a major step to 
induce recruitment .  
On October 2 4 ,  1 8 6 4  the Oregon l eg i s l ature passed a 
bounty l aw .  The law provided for $ 1 5 0  to be paid to each 
three year volunteer. The bounties were paid in install-
ments with United States bonds at seven per cent intere s t  
due i n  1 8 8 4 and payable in specie . Oregon volunteers who 
served prior to this law ' s  enactment a l so received five 
dollars for each month of their enlistment ,  in bonds bearing 
sev�n percent due in 1 8 7 5 . 1 5 6  Lucki ly , the bounty law 
provided the encouragement Oregonians needed to volunteer . 
Gibbs was pleased that the legislature passed the 
bounty law , a lthough he felt the appropriations were too 
low. However , the law fulfilled its goa l .  Recruitment 
vastly accelerated in comparison to previous calls for 
troops , and the infantry ranks quickly f i l led . Adjutant 
General Reed also complimented the legisl ature for passing 
the law, and relayed his gratitude for additional private 
bounties that were donated by c i t i z ens . Company A ,  F i r s t  
Oregon In fantry , was completed w i thin a week o f  the ca l l ,  
and the s ix companies that completed the regiment were 
mustered in on June 2 4 ,  1 8 6 s . 1 5 7  The o f ficers for the 
First Oregon Infantry were taken largely from the cavalry 
regiment,  and cavalry Captain George B .  Currey was 
commissioned as a Colonel and placed in the infantry ' s  
command . 
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The First Oregon Infantry was recruited swiftly , but 
problems requiring military attention surfaced before the 
regiment was f i l l ed .  The call for the infantry regiment was 
made in October , 1 8 6 4  in anticipation of possible violence 
in connection with the presidential e lection in 1 8 6 4 .  By 
1 8 6 4 ,  howeve r ,  the Knights were more numerous and organi z ed . 
Once aga i n ,  Oregon officials received threats that i f  
Lincoln were elected the Knights would rebe l .  They had 
stored their arms near polling p l aces and were prepared 
to prevent Lincoln ' s  e lection with force . 1 5 8  
Governor Gibbs took steps to neutra l i z e  the Knight s ' 
plan. The governor alerted the mil itary and directed i t  
to be highly visible a t  the poll ing places . Gibbs gave 
the First Oregon Cavalry general instructions and Oregon ' s  
Acting Assistant Adjutant General Hopkins received thi s 
order on November 3 ,  1 8 6 4 :  
I t  has been reported to these headquarters that 
threats have been made of violence at the pol l s  
on the 8 t h  instant , the day o f  the presidential 
e lection. . The general w i l l  not believe tha t 
any use o f  military force w i l l  be necessary . But 
the governor o f  Oregon and other officers o f  the 
civil authority having had reason to apprehend 
something of the kind it is proper that your command 
should hold itself in readiness to act . 1 5 9 
The governor ' s  policy was to send an entire unarmed regiment 
to a poll ing place to a l low the soldiers to vote. The 
troops remained at the poll ing place a f ter they voted in 
the event the civil authorities needed help to enforce 
order . Gibbs stated this intention and requested Brigadier 
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General Alvord ' s  compliance . 1 6 0  The governor ' s  policy was a 
general success . The Knights never gained control o f  a 
polling place,  and the election proceeded unimpaired.  The 
1 8 6 4  e lection results were a clear indication o f  Oregonian 
sentiment in support of the new Union Party . 
I n  1 8 6 0  Lincoln carried Oregon by a small plural ity , 
but by 1 8 6 4  he won by a c l ear majority . Oregon ' s  o fficial 
vote total in 1 8 6 4  was 9 , 8 8 8  for Lincoln and 8 , 4 5 7  for h i s  
riva l ,  W a r  Democrat George Brinton McClellan . Lincoln 
defeated McClellan by a convincing 1 , 4 3 1  vote maj ority . No 
statement better i l lustrates the evolution of Oregonians ' 
devotion to the Union during the War .  The infi ltration o f  
secessionists into the Oregon Democratic party forced 
Oregonians to prove their Union sentiment by j o ining the 
Union party fold.  The Sentinel reported in 1 8 6 2  that the 
Oregon Democratic party was "wholly defunct , "  and it had 
"been shaken into separate e lements by the convulsions o f  
civil war . " 1 6 1  The 1 8 6 4  Oregon election-returns bore out 
this truth . 
however .  
Oregon ' s  support for Lincoln can be mislead i ng , 
Oregonians supported Lincoln because he represented a 
vote for the Union , and it is incorrect to assume that they 
were h i s  avid supporter s .  They supported Lincoln because 
they felt he was the best man to restore the Union , and they 
wanted the Union restored as it existed prior to the Civil 
War . But Oregonians fina l l y  realized that the Civil War 
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had ushered i n  permanent changes and they accepted the 
poss ibility of a new Union over no Union . I t  became 
increasingly apparent that the old Union was gone forever , 
and most Oregonians grudgingly accepted this fact . 
Oregonians realized that a permanent Union could not be 
maintained i f  the federal government did not suppress the 
rebe llion , and Lincoln was the candidate that committed to 
this goa l .  
Oregonians fully approved o f  Lincoln ' s  vigorous 
prosecution of the War , but they disproved of h i s  policy 
toward blacks . His Emancipation Proclamation was soundly 
denounced in Oregon, and only the few Radical Repub l icans i n  
conservative Oregon supported the Proclamation. 1 6 2  I n  fac t ,  
the Proclamation almost caused a serious schism in the 
Repub l ican-Douglas Democrat " Union" coalition in Oregon for 
the 1 8 6 4  election. This potential prob lem was evaded when 
the Oregon delegates attended the " national convention , "  and 
omitted the word " Republican . "  Oregonians retained the i r  
hatred toward blacks throughout the War and most had never 
supported abo lition . Lincoln ' s  Proclamation even forced 
Asahel Bush to switch h i s  support from Lincoln to McC l P. llan 
after 1 8 6 3 ,  but this did not have a great impact upon 
Oregonians . Oregonians reluctantly accepted abolition as an 
undeniable fact only as a means to restore the Union . Even 
the resolutions passed in the state legislature in 1 8 6 2  that 
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supported Lincoln and the War asserted that Oregon fought 
the war to preserve the Union and not to free the slaves .  
Mo st Oregonians , excluding the Knight s ,  were 
conservative throughout the war . They accepted the fact 
that the Emancipation Proclamation and the growing in fluence 
of the Radical Repub l i c ans " sounded the death kne l l "  o f  
the old Union , but they did not change their views on 
s l avery . 1 6 3  The conservative attitude was best i l lustrated 
by the early utterances of two people who became leading 
Oregon Republicans . I n  1 8 5 6  David Logan wrote his s ister : 
The Whigs are a l l  dead out here - they c a l l  
themselves the Republican party - which means 
negro worshipers [ s i c ] . I can ' t  go the Locofocos 
and I ' l l see the Republ icans to the Devil before 
I ' ll vote with them. I don ' t  know what I am exactly , 
but anything but an abolitioni s t . 1 6 4  
Lincoln ' s  friend Anson G .  Henry wrote him a letter i n  1 8 5 9  
and desired " the triumph o f  a conservative Republican party 
who w i l l  repudiate Massachusetts foolery and adopt 
intervention plank as part of their platform . 11 1 6 5  
Throughout the War , the Oregon Republ i c an party more closely 
resembled the national Douglas Democrats than the national 
Republican party in regard to slavery . I t  i s  important to 
remember that the national Republican party was 
factionalized during the War ,  whi l e  Oregon ' s  Republicans 
remained relatively solidified throughout Lincoln ' s  
admini s tration . 
Public reaction in Oregon to Lincoln ' s  administration 
was exemplified after the news of Lincoln ' s  death . 
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Lincoln ' s  assass ination was received with acute diversity in 
Orego n .  Many loyal Lincoln supporters were deeply bereaved , 
but the Copperhead e lement was exuberant . The Copperhead s '  
level of enthusiasm was so high that General McDowe l l  
labelled them " accessories a fter the fact . "  I n  General 
Order # 2 7  i s sued on Apri l  1 7 ,  1 8 6 5  McDow e l l  declared that 
any person who exulted over Lincoln ' s  a s s a s s ination would 
be arrested by any law enforcement o ff i c i a l  that had any 
knowledge of the case . He further threatened that " any 
paper so of fending or expressing any sympathy in any way 
whatever with the act wil l be at once seized and 
suppressed . 11 1 6 6  The nature of McDowe l l ' s  order i l lustrated 
that Lincoln had s t rong support even in death , but the need 
to i s sue the order also indicated that there remained some 
opposition to Lincoln . 
Generally , the Oregon frontier remained secure 
following Lincol n ' s  a s sa s s ination . The state ' s  abi lity 
to hold the Knights in check had been demonstrated during 
the election of 1 8 6 4 . The military ' s  ability to thwart 
Copperhead rebellions was again demonstrated following 
Lincoln ' s  assas sination . Military officials in Oregon 
predicted trouble in the traditional secess ion i s t  hotbed 
of Eugene City , near Fort Hosk ins , Oreg on . In Apr i l ,  j u s t  
after the news o f  Lincoln ' s  assas s ination arrived , two 
companies of the proposed F i r s t  Oregon In fantry were 
stationed at Fort Hoskins and a lerted that they would be 
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ordered to disperse any rebellion in Eugene City . Although 
the First Oregon Infantry was not officially established 
until Jun e ,  1 8 6 5 ,  companies A and B were mustered in early 
and used for garrison duty. 1 6 7  The predicted rebellions 
never materiali zed , and peace on the Oregon frontier was 
enforced by intimidation . 
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V I .  CONCLUSION 
A few basic premises have to be considered before an 
accurate analysis of Lincoln ' s  policy toward Oregon can be 
mad e .  The most important factor concerning his policy 
toward Oregon was the rudimentary communicat ion facilities 
at the War ' s  out s e t . The amount o f  time required for 
correspondence between Washington, D . C .  and the Pacific 
Coast was roughly one month in either direction . This 
factor greatly strengthened the subvers ive sec8ssionist 
movement in many ways . Secessionist plans could be 
implemented before the federal government could reac t .  
I t  was a lso d i f ficult for the federal government t o  assess 
the true state of Oregon ' s  social and political environment . 
The commun ications that Lincoln received were mostly 
encapsulated incidents that could eas i ly be d i s torted or 
taken out of contex t . The lack of adequate communi c ation 
with Oregon before the telegraph was connected at Portland 
in 1 8 6 3  doubtlessly contributed to a lack of timely 
information concerning Oregon . 
disadvantage for Lincoln . 
This factor was an obvious 
The commun ication problem also a f fected Lincoln ' s  
leadership style . Lincoln preferred to run the government 
and the War directly . Al though he consul ted with h i s  
cabinet and advisors o n  po licies and orders , h i s  u l t imate 
dec i sions were his own . Generally, Lincoln personally 
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exerc ised his powers . Howeve r ,  the communication and 
distance factors required that he change his leadership 
style toward Oregon to an indirect delegation of power . 
Lincoln successfully turned this potential defic iency into 
an asse t .  The key t o  Lincol n ' s  daily policy toward Oregon 
was the appointment o f  men in high posi tions who understood 
his philosophy and who would dutifully carry out appropriate 
actions . In this way Lincoln ' s  po licy was carried out , 
although he was not i n  constant contact with Oregon 
official s .  
The e f fectiveness of Lincoln ' s  policies in Oregon was 
also partially due to the wording of h i s  orders .  H e  i ssued 
ambiguous orders which in most cases c on s i s ted of a broad 
policy statement that supplied the loyal Oregon officials 
with s u f f icient latitude to attain the stated goa l s .  John 
N .  King, Chief Commissary for the D i s trict of Oregon 
summarized this atmosphere in a letter to h i s  s i ster on July 
2 4 ,  1 8 6 3  from Fort Vancouver : 
. We have a great many sece s s ionists out here and 
many more are coming, but we are not apprehensive of any 
outbreak , should they do so they w i l l  have a very rough 
time of i t ,  and war can be carried on here without the 
m i l itary officers , being interfered with by politician s ,  
and orders from Washington - I think we would carry o n  a 
war in earnest , make i t  short and decisive , and pay no 
respect to persons who have any sympathy with the rebels 
or . . .  with the Copperheads . 1 6 8 
Lincol n ' s  appointees , beginning with General Sumner , 
were unquestionably loy a l  Union men who unders tood and 
diligently carried out their assignment . The initial 
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quality o f  Lincoln ' s  appointees was , o f  course , due largely 
to Edward Bake r .  Baker ' s  knowledge and advice concerning 
Oregon and its inhabitants was invaluable to Lincoln ' s  
polic y .  Fortunately , Baker advised Lincoln concerning many 
appointments until his abrupt death in 1 8 6 1 .  Baker ' s  
usefulness was never equa lled,  although by 1 8 6 5  Anson G .  
Henry c l aime d ,  "The whole Pacific Coast Delegation don ' t  
hesitate to acknowledge their obligation to me in securing 
them the ear of the President when they could not obtain 
it through the ordinary avenues , and thus I saved them 
important interests politically and personally . " 1 6 9  
Lincoln ' s  problems with Oregon secessionists were 
twofold . He had to remove Southern sympathizers from 
federal o ffices to prevent them from encouraging a 
secessionist rebe l lion . However , Lincoln had to remove 
these Copperheads without appearing too harsh so as not to 
provoke a rebellion among the masse s .  Carrying out some 
policies without of fending many Oregonians was a d i f ficult 
task before Fort Sumter ' s  fall solidi fied Union sentiment . 
Had Linco l n  rashly removed General Johnston before he 
received evidence that he was a traitor , militant secess ion-
ist sentiment could have been mobi lized . Lincoln ' s  patience 
concerning the Johnston s ituation prevented thi s .  Lincoln ' s  
success in this respect was due largely to his in formants , 
mainly Baker and Senator Nesmi t h .  Baker and Nesmith assured 
Lincoln that Oregonians ' Union devotion was dominant over 
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sece s s ionist sentiment . This assurance a llowed Lincoln to 
implement his effective policy.  Lincoln ' s  policy toward 
Oregon was as cautious as i t  was e f fective . 
The composition of Oregon ' s  popu lation resembled that 
o f  Union states bordering the Confederacy . The state ' s  
political atmosphere made it abundantly clear that Oregon 
was neither a purely pro- s lave nor an anti-slave state and 
its prewar sympathies were split between the North and 
South . Lincoln realized this and ascertained that it 
behooved him to treat Oregon cautiou s l y ,  and not antagon­
istically . Oregonians historica lly detested federal 
appointments granted to non-Oregonians within their state . 
With this in mind , Lincoln ' s  political plums in Oregon went 
mainly to Oregonians . I t  was impo s s ible to f i l l  a l l  
military appointments within the state with i t s  residents ; 
but ,  the popular Oregon Indian war hero George Wright was 
commissioned Brigadier Genera l .  Wright briefly commanded 
the District of Oregon, and the Department o f  the P ac i f i c  
from November 1 9 ,  1 8 6 1  to July 1 ,  1 8 6 4 .  
Lincoln ' s  faith in Oregon ' s  Union sentiment was we l l ­
founde d .  Before Fort sumter ' s  fa l l ,  mos t Oregonians 
genuinely vac il lated concerning the i r  philosophical support 
for either the North or South. But a fter Fort Sumter was 
attacked many clearly felt the South was wrong . Lincol n ' s  
unantagon istic policy toward Oregon a lso magnified the 
perception of Southern rashnes s .  The maj ority o f  Oregonians 
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clearly i<le ntif ied Lincoln and the Union as the right side 
in the war .  S imeon Francis relayed this thought in a letter 
on June 2 1 ,  1 8 6 2 :  
. The democrats are trying to Un ion dodge here 
[Washington Territory ] .  The shrewd ones are getting 
on platforms to read every way - to be explained just 
to put the d i f ferent phrases and doctrines o f  democracy 
- or to keep the dear speck of that flock together . 
The same scheme was tried in Oregon and it didn ' t  wor k .  
[Oregonian s ]  won ' t  be diverted from an honest and 
patriotic cause when they understand what that i s . 1 7 0  
Lincoln ' s  success ful courting o f  Oregon hinged on the 
succe s s ful retention of the state in the Union . Southerners 
reali zed that Oregon ' s  di stance from Washington , D . C .  and 
the War ' s  epicenter , might a i d  their cause i f  Lincoln had 
to subdue the Oregonians with eastern troop s .  Lincoln a l s o  
realized t h i s  and tried t o  avoid that scenario.  Lincoln ' s  
patience and understanding toward Oregon insured its loyalty 
and e l iminated the need for eastern troops to subdue the 
state . Oregon was kept i n  the Union by i t s  own troops 
throughout the War which enabled eastern troops to actively 
fight the Wa r ;  and, Lincoln was freed from many d i stractions 
that would have surfaced i f  the secess ionists gained 
contro l .  Lincol n ' s  po licy during the war allowed Oregonians 
to take care of matters within their s tate while he 
concentrated on the War in the Eas t .  
Oreyonians attained many o f  their domestic demands 
during Lincoln ' s  admi ni stration . Lincoln incorporated 
Oregon into the federal c ircuit court sys tem . He a lso 
fortified the state ' s  coastline and s igned the long aw�itcd 
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Homestead Ac t .  wartime finances and Oregon ' s  gold also 
encouraged Lincoln to initiate transportation and 
communication advancement s .  The zeal with which most 
Oregonians supported Lincol n ' s  prosecution of the War was 
a l so evident by the state ' s  generous contributions to the 
Sanitary Commi ssion . 
Oregon was one o f  the few s tates that was systematic­
a l ly organized and canvassed for donations to the Sanitary 
fund . I n  almost every public gathering a col lection was 
taken for the fund, and often the more spontaneous the 
collection,  the more money was received . Amory Holbrook , 
a Republican state legi s lator , was Oregon ' s  chief Sanitary 
Commi s s ion agent. Oregon donated a total of $ 7 9 , 3 7 1 . 1 9  to 
the fund , according to the Commission ' s  offic i a l  report . 
Oregon was the fifth largest contributor , behind only 
Californ i a ,  New York, Massachusetts , and Nevada 
respectively . The Comm i s s ion ' s  report noted Oregon ' s  
exceptional donation, and what made it more extraordinary 
was that the armies that Oregonians ' donated to were 
fighting thousands of miles from their state . The support 
that Oregon and the Pac i f i c  Coast gave the Sanitary 
Commiss ion enabled the Commi ss ion to prove itself a truly 
nationa l organization. 1 7 1  
Oregon ' s  poten t i a l  importance to both the North and 
South, coupled with its vac i l lation between each side made 
that state an unpredictable swing state for the Union 
9 1  
e f fort . But , in the end , Oregon ' s  fidelity to the Union 
was strong . Oregon ' s  generous monetary donation and its 
provision o f  troops vastly aided Lincoln ' s  War e f for t .  
Oregon ' s  devotion to the Union was a direc t  result o f  
Lincoln ' s  patience and sagaciousne s s .  I f  Lincoln had 
antagonized the Oregonians during the secess ion cris i s , 
Albert Sidney Johnston and Joe Lane could have possibly 
obtained increased support and formed a Pacific Coast 
Republ i c  or at least hampered the Union e f fort . The fact 
that Oregon ' s  part in the War is relatively unmentioned i n  
Civil War stu<lies attests t o  the success o f  Lincoln ' s  policy 
toward Oregon and the Pacific Coast . Lincoln e f fectively 
but quietly insured Oregon ' s  support for the Union . 
9 2  
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